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A UNIFYING THEORY FOR THE
LITIGATION OF COMPUTER
SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT CASESt
John M. Conley*
Robert M. Bryan**
As the use of computers has increaseddramatically,so. has the illegal copying and adaptation of computer software. Because programs
can be varied quickly and easily, however, copying of programscan be
disguised more readily than copying of literary and other artistic
works. Thus,factfinders, particularlythose unfamiliarwith computer
software, may not be able to detect copying by comparing competing
programsfor "substantialsimilarity," as traditionallyis done in copyright cases. Professor Conley and Mr. Bryan argue that courts should
focus on whether the alleged infringer's actual conduct constitutes infringement. This approach is not only practical, but more consistent
with languagein the 1976 CopyrightAct prohibitingconduct other than
verbatim copying.
Companies and individuals engaged in high technology businesses
are realizing increasingly that computer programs and the intellectual
work product they embody are assets of great value.' In some instances, computer software may be a business' only substantial asset.
Thus, intellectual property protection is one of the most significant
t Reprinted with permission from 63 N.C.L. Rev. 563 (1985). Copyright © 1985 by
North Carolina Law Review Association.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. B.A. 1971, Harvard University; J.D. 1977, Ph.D. 1980, Duke University.
** Partner, Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina. B.A.
1971, J.D. 1976, University of Virginia. The authors wish to acknowledge the research
assistance of Ken R. Bramlett, Jr. and Pamela G. Hubbard of Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., and to thank Henry W. Jones III of Atlanta, Georgia for his thoughtful commentary on an earlier draft of the Article.
1. See generally J. SOMA, THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 28-30 (1976) (review of industry's
change in emphasis from hardware to software development); Software Rentals: Piracy is
the Hot New Issue, Bus. WK. Aug. 1, 1983, at 90, 91 (discussing economic value of software
and financial threat of illegal copying through rentals).
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legal problems that high technology companies face regularly. This Article focuses on one important type of protection, copyright.
For reasons that will be developed more fully in sections I and II of
the Article, copyright protection is likely to be central to any broader
program of protection of the intellectual property embodied in computer programs. The federal courts are familiar at least with the general contours of copyright law, and the copyright statute provides ample
authority for meaningful relief. Nonetheless, copyright law evolved in
the preelectronic era, and the articulation of modern technology and
copyright principles derived from art, literature, and music is less than
precise. Accordingly, a computer copyright case presents novel legal
challenges on both the theoretical and practical levels.
The purpose of this Article is to identify, analyze, and offer solutions to several important problems endemic to computer copyright litigation. In sections IA and IB, the Article reviews the process of writing
a computer program to identify the various species of intellectual property that a typical program may embody. In section IC, the legal protections available for these various categories of intellectual property are
discussed. In section II the Article reviews the procedural aspects of
copyright litigation; section III presents an analysis of the traditional elements of copyright protection and the evidence necessary to prove infringement, discusses a number of special problems of proof common to
computer cases, and suggests several strategies to overcome such difficulties. The principal thesis that the Article sets forth in sections IV
and V is that the evidentiary standard relied on in the vast majority of
literary copyright cases-the substantial similarity test-is likely to be
of limited utility in a software case. Instead, courts should examine
other types of direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant's conduct that often may be available in software cases. The controlling determination should be whether the defendant has derived a substantial
and lasting economic advantage by borrowing from the plaintiff's program information that fairly can be characterized as expression.
I.

Computer Programming and Intellectual Property Law
A.

THE PROCESS OF WRITING A COMPUTER PROGRAM

Computer programs, often known as software, instruct in code the
machinery of a computer system, the hardware, to run and to perform
various tasks. 2 Programs, to borrow a phrase from Arthur Koestler, are
2. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (N.D.
Tex. 1978); see 1 D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 2.06 (1984); J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOL.

OGY AND THE LAW § 1.06 (1983); Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object
Code, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1983).
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the "ghost in the machine."'3 Computer programs can perform an almost infinite variety of functions. Systems programs control the basic
functioning of the hardware and make it generally available for specific
uses to which it may be put.4 In legal terminology, such systems programs might be described as "procedural." Their "substantive" counterparts are applications programs,5 which cause a computer to perform
such specific tasks as printing a document, computing an average, or doing a word search within a body of case law. 6 The following discussion
pertains to both of these major software categories.
A computer program typically is written in several steps.7 First,
the programmer studies the function to be performed and outlines the
general structure of the program.8 In writing a program to perform statistical calculations, for example, the programmer first might outline a
number of procedures. One procedure might calculate means, one
might perform correlation analysis, and another might execute regression analysis. Having thus determined the program's general structure,
the programmer then might break it down into sections, or modules,
each of which would be designed to perform one or more tasks. 9 Within
the regression procedure, a single module might accept and organize input data, several other modules might do portions of the necessary calculations, and a final module might organize the output data. The
organization of the program at various levels is a largely discretionary
process, and the decisions made at the organizational stage may affect
the program's efficiency and utility.
Only after the programmer thus conceives and organizes the program is he ready to begin writing the computer code. 10 At this level,
programming is done in blocks, each of which implements a specific
function. A block of code may embody one or more algorithms, which
3. A. KOESTLER, THE GHOST IN THE MACHINE (1967).
4. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[2]; J. SOMA,
supra note 2, §2.01, at 23.
5. For a discussion of the distinction between systems and applications programs, see
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983), cert
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 1.051]; J. SOMA, supra note 2,
§ 1.06.
6. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3]; J. SOMA,
supra note 2, §2.01, at 23-24.
7. See 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3]; Davidson, Protecting ComputerSoftware:
A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 337, 341-42 (1983).
8. See 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, §2.06[3][a].
9. See id.
10. For a general discussion of writing code, see id. § 2.06[3][d] and authorities cited
therein; Davidson, supra note 7, at 341.
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are step-by-step logical procedures for solving programming problems.1 '
The algorithm chosen to accomplish a particular functional objective
may determine in part the contents of a segment of code. Nonetheless,
writing the code is often a highly creative process, and programmers
could choose various coding techniques to achieve the same functional
objective. 12 Once again, the programmer's choices will influence the
program's accuracy, efficiency, and flexibility.
13
The code that the programmer writes is called the "source code.'
Source code usually is written in a "high-level" computer language,
meaning one that is similar to English.' 4 Source code can be understood
readily by other programmers and thus would be helpful in copying the
program or appropriating the programming concepts and methods that
the program embodies.
The computer does not use the source code directly to execute the
program or otherwise perform work. First, another program, called a
compiler, through a complex process reads and translates source code
into a language that the computer can read and execute.' 5 This version
11. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1367 (D. Del. 1983). C. SIPPLE & R. SIPPLE, COMPUTER DICTIONARY
AND HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1972), defines the term "algorithm" more comprehensively as:
(1) A fixed step-by-step procedure for accomplishing a given result; usually a
simplified procedure for solving a complex problem, also a full statement of a finite number of steps.
(2) A defined process or set of rules that leads [sic] and assures development of a
desired output from a given input. A sequence of formulas and/or algebraic/logical steps to calculate or determine a given task; processing rules.
Id. at 23, quoted in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1367 (D. Del. 1983). For varying interpretations of
the term, see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 n.9 (1981); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915-16
(C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Phillips, 608 F.2d 879, 882-83 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
12. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 18-23 (1978) (distinguishing function from expression in programs)
[hereinafter cited as CONTU REPORT]. Cf.Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing extent of originality in operating systems), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
13. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
14. Id.; see 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3][c]; J. SOMA, supra note 2, glossary at
419; Davidson, supra note 7, at 341.
15. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3][c]; Davidson, supra note 7, at 341, 382-83. The central processing unit of a computer is capable of
performing only a very small number of highly specific tasks. A typical mainframe computer may have slightly over 100 "operations" or "machine instructions" in its repertoire,
each of which is identified by a numerical "operation code." An operation code can be
combined with additional information, such as a reference to a specific location in memory, to constitute a machine instruction word. A sequence of such machine instruction
words, stored in the computer's memory and executed sequentially by the central process-
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of the program is called "object code." Object code is loaded onto the
computer on a storage medium such as a tape, disk, or semiconductor
chip. 16 Few computer programmers are willing and able to read object
code; its distribution therefore poses less of a security risk than the distribution of source code.' 7 Since object code is sufficient and generally
necessary to execute the program, it almost always is distributed to
users.' 8 If the user wants to distribute the source code, he can negotiate
the matter with the proprietor. 19
A distinguishing characteristic of the programming process is its iterative nature. As soon as the programmer has written enough code to
produce a rough working version of the program, he typically loads the
code onto a computer for repeated execution and analysis. This process
is grossly analogous to an author editing a literary work, although the
programmer is more concerned with the program's functional efficiency
than the code's intellectual and aesthetic appeal, and he is aided by the
computer in identifying and correcting errors. The process of testing,
analysis, and refinement usually continues until and after commerical
distribution; purchasers or licensees of commercial software often receive updates, enhancements, and sequentially numbered versions of
the program. Although the editing process sometimes is called "debugging," to distinguish it from the initial writing of code, many programmers view the two activities merely as related facets of a single creative
process. 20 Early versions of the program created during the debugging
ing unit, makes up a "machine language" program. Machine language is the only type of
programming language that the computer understands. 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2,
§ 2.06[3][c]. Thus, if a program is coded in any other language it must be converted into
machine language before the computer can use it. Id.

16. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d. 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980); Note,
supra note 2, at 1725.
17. The development of technology for "decompiling" object code, or translating it
back to source cede, is making object code distribution an increasing security threat. See
Davidson, supra note 7, at 411; Grogan, Decompilation and Disassembly: Undoing
Software Protection, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1984, at 1, 2; Laurie & Everett, Protection of

Trade Secrets in Object Form Software: The Case for Reverse Engineering, COMPUTER
LAW., July 1984, at 1.
18. See Grogan, supra note 17, at 1-2.
19. Proprietors, of course, desire maximum copyright and trade secret protection for
their intellectual property. Users, however, may be concerned about access to the source
code for maintenance purposes if the proprietor goes out of business or otherwise fails to
meet its maintenance obligations. A method used increasingly to accommodate these
competing concerns is to place source code in escrow pending specified events of default;
if the proprietor goes bankrupt, however, the enforceability of such an escrow is uncertamn. See Conley & Bryan, Software Escrow and "Cram-Down" License Assignments
under the New Bankruptcy Code, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COMPUTER LAW INSTI-

TUTE 565 (D. Brooks ed. 1983).
20. See 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3][e].
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process often are preserved or "archived" on paper or a computer memory device, providing an historical record of a program's development.
The package that the user ultimately receives also may contain several items not strictly part of the program but nonetheless essential to
its use. The documentation that accompanies most commercially distributed programs may vary, depending on the program and the intended
users, from simple instructions to a detailed guide for modifying the
program for special needs. Although the documentation rarely reproduces source code, detailed documentation may reveal much about pro21
gram structure and programming methods.
Finally, many programs offer what is loosely termed a "language"
to enable the user to interact with the software. This Article previously
has used "language" to mean the computer language in which source
code is written. In the present context, "language" means a system of
specified commands, statements, and symbols with which a software
user organizes and enters his own data and directs the operation of the
program.22 Although the user language is not part of the program in
the sense of being a segment of the source or object code, user language
instructions cause the program to function and thus are essential to the
use of the program. Moreover, since the user sees and deals with the
user language, it may be the component of the program that the consumer most identifies with the product.
B.

THE SPECIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EMBODIED IN COMPUTER
PROGRAMS

In its broadest sense, the term "intellectual property" includes, on
one level, ideas, concepts, know-how, and other creative abstractions,
and on a second level, the literary, artistic, or mechanical expressions
that embody such abstractions.23 Intellectual property is distinct from
tangible or physical property, even though a single object may embody
both. A book is tangible property that contains expression that is intellectual property; the selling of the physical property does not affect the
24
author's right to control reproduction of his expression.
Some computer scientists believe that every level of the programming process yields valuable intellectual property on which the
21. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 n.5
(N.D. Tex. 1978); Davidson, supra note 7, at 379-80. Formerly, documentation often included actual source code.
22. For descriptions of user languages used with two well-known statistical programs,
see BMDP STATISTICAL SOFTWARE 25 (W.J. Dixon ed. 1983); M. NORUSIS, SPSS INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS GUIDE 175 (1983).
23. See generally A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT 1-2 (1983) (reviewing types of intellectual property).

24. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982).
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programmer has a proprietary claim. 25 In the initial, organizational
phase of software production, the programmer's creative contribution is
in the form of concepts and ideas. Although most choices that the
programmer makes in this phase are discretionary to some extent, he
often must choose among options on which he can assert no claim, such
as established programming languages or well-documented methods for
breaking a task down into modules. At other times, however, the
programmer makes an identifiable creative contribution at this level,
such as organizing a novel programming task or devising a new modular
structure that improves on established means for achieving a particular
functional end.
The intellectual property generated by the actual writing of source
code comprises both ideas and expression. At the level of ideas, the
programmer must choose how to organize individual lines and groups of
lines, and what programming strategies to employ in particular situations.26 He may have to develop algorithms or choose among available
algorithms. 27 Some of the concepts and ideas employed at the codewriting level may be original, whereas others simply will reflect borrowing or adaptation of the creative efforts of others.
A programmer writing code also must synthesize the words and
symbols that constitute actual programming statements. A line of code,
like a line of literary prose, is the programmer's expression of all the
ideas and concepts that the line embodies. 28 At this final stage of programming, unless the programmer is copying or closely following a preexisting work, his contributions probably will be sufficiently original to
29
give rise to a proprietary claim.
Software documentation is analytically indistinguishable from any
other nonfiction literary work. The documentation includes many concepts and ideas, some borrowed and some original, which the author
then expresses in a manner he creates or borrows from another
25. A leading, recently-published text therefore recommends that software be subject
to a "matrix" of copyright, patent, and trade secret protection. J. SOMA, supra note 2,
§ 2.18, at 67-70.
26. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. In statistical programming, calculations often may be done in a number of sequences. Although the choice of sequence may
not affect the accuracy of the calculations, it sometimes may affect computing efficiency.
The cumulative effect of many such choices therefore may influence the marketability of
a software product.

27. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. The choice of algorithm may have
an effect similar to that discussed supra note 26.
28. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 9-10, 20-21.

29. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249-54 (3d
Cir. 1983) (discussing originality of expression in computer programs), cert. dismissed, 104
S. Ct. 690 (1984); infra notes 194-246 and accompanying text.
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30

source.
It is particularly difficult to identify the intellectual property embodied in a user language. The language typically will comprise words
and symbols, some original, others with counterparts in English, a programming language, or the symbolism of mathematics and logic. 31 The

language's syntax, or rules for arranging these elements, likewise may
combine the author's original contributions with rules derived from
English, a programming language, or mathematics. When the language
is used to cause the computer system to perform a task, the ultimate
form of expression rests with the user, since he will select and combine
elements to fit his data and programming needs.32 Thus, although the
author initially may contribute ideas and concepts, they may be difficult
to identify and segregate; at the level of expression, he may have little
or no claim of originality or even contribution. Nonetheless, regardless
of the source of the elements, the author legitimately may claim that
synthesizing the entire system required substantial creativity and ingenuity. Moreover, the user language often is the user's primary or even
33
sole contact with the author's work.
C.

LEGAL THEORIES AVAILABLE TO PROTECT DIFFERENT
CATEGORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

One or more legal theories are available to protect each category of
intellectual property discussed above. The choice of the theory or theories appropriate to each category depends on both the nature of the intellectual property to be protected and the method of distributing the
software product.
1.

Patent Protection

Patents protect "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
30. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 n.5
(N.D. Tex. 1978); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3][f].
31. The language in the SAS statistical package is a good illustration of such a combination of elements. See, e.g., SAS Reference Guide 79.5 (SAS Institute, Inc. 1981); cf. 1 D.
BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3][c] (discussing composition of high-level programming
languages).
32. Similarly, with videogames, the display derives from interaction between the
game program and the user who constantly chooses among available options. Several
courts have concluded that the user's contribution does not undermine the copyright status of the game programs. E.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011-12
(7th Cir. 1983); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1982). See generally Jones, Video Game Litigation and the 1976 Copyright Act: The Ideas of Games, The
Expression of Aliens and the Underlying Computer Software, 1 J. COPYRIGHT, ENTER. &
SPoRTs L. 17 (1982) (comprehensive review of videogame case law).
33. See Jones, supra note 32, at 18.
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thereof. ' 34 The patentee holds the exclusive right to use, manufacture,
and sell the patented invention. 35 A patent protects the specific invention itself-the patented machine, process, or matter-rather than the
scientific discoveries, mathematical principles, or laws of nature underlying the invention. 36 Thus, competitors are free to "invent around" the
patent by devising a dissimilar device that performs the same function
in a different way. 3 7 Design patents, which cover such things as ornamental structures, have a life of fourteen years;38 utility patents, which
products and the processes used to develop
cover machines and other 39
years.
seventeen
last
them,
In the 1972 case of Gottschalk v. Benson 40 the Supreme Court held
unpatentable a computerized process for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals. The Court reasoned that such
a patent would grant a monopoly on a mathematical algorithm, which
was equivalent to a traditionally unpatentable abstract intellectual concept.41 In subsequent decisions the Supreme Court held not patentable
two other processes that used computer programs, but did not foreclose
34. 5 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.03, at 26-27.
35. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a) (1982).
36. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-84, 191-92 (1981). For a more general discussion of patent coverage, see J. SOMA, supra note 2, §§ 2.03-.04, at 26-35; Davidson, supra
note 7, at 348-59. For a discussion of the economic factors involved in giving patent protection to software, see Note, The Policy Implications of Granting Patent Protection to
Computer Software: An Economic Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 147 (1984).
37. See R. CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, PATENT LAW 634-35 (2d ed. 1981).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1982); see J. SoMA, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 25.
39. 35 U.S.C. §154 (1982); see J. SoMA, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 25.
40. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). The Court sought to resolve conflicting decisions from the Patent and Trademark Office and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. In 1968, the
Patent Office took the position that a computer program, whether claimed as a process or
as part of an apparatus, was unpatentable. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197-98
(1981). In that same year, however, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals issued two
opinions that repudiated the longstanding legal doctrines on which the Patent Office
based its position. See In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 857 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (rejecting
doctrine that process which amounted to nothing more than a description of the function
of a machine was unpatentable); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1379 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (rejecting doctrine that processes which could be performed mentally were unpatentable),
modified on reh'g, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). Then, in In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395,
1400-01 (C.C.P.A. 1969), the court reaffirmed Prater and also announced that apparatus
patents could be obtained for existing computers programmed in new and unobvious
ways. Finally, in In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 892-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970), the court again emphasized Prater'srejection of the so-called "mental steps" doctrine and held that a computerized seismic interpretation process was patentable. A sequence of operational steps
was a patentable process, the court held, as long as the process fell within the technological arts, regardless of whether it replicated a mental process. See J. SoMA, supra note 2,
§2.03 at 29-30.
41. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67, 71-73; see J. SoMA, supra note 2, § 2.03, at 30.
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entirely the patenting of programs. 42 Most recently, in Diamond v.
Diehr,43 the Court held that an otherwise patentable industrial process
which employed a computer system to perform essential calculations
was not thereby rendered unpatentable.
These decisions suggest several observations about the patentability
of computer software. First, the Supreme Court seems to have left
open whether computer software standing alone, not tied in the patent
application to a patentable machine or process, constitutes patentable
45
subject matter.44 There is post-Diehr case support for both positions.
Second, Diehr appears to suggest that otherwise patentable processes
will not be denied protection simply because they use computer hardware and software. 46 Similarly, software more likely will be patentable
if the claimed invention is described as a process in which the software
is applied.47 Last, these decisions do not undermine the patentability of
42. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229-30
(1976).
43. 450 U.S. 175, 187-88, 191-93 (1981); see J. SOMA,supra note 2, § 2.04, at 33-35. The
Diehr Court stated that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or
digital computer. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
44. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72; J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.03, at 30-31.
45. Compare Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1368-69 (D. Del. 1983) (data processing methodology for
cash management account held patentable subject matter in declaratory judgment action)
(appeal pending) and In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916-917 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (reversing Patent
and Trademark Office's rejection of patent application for invention that converted computer from sequential processor to processor that could receive program steps in any orders) and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907-09 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (patent application claims
directed to improvement in computer tomography patentable subject matter) and In re
Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (claims relating to method of seismic exploration were
patentable subject matter) with In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (claimed
method of replacing thinking processes of neurologist with computer not statutory subject
matter). For an analysis of the cases, see Milde, Life after Diamond v. Diehr: The CCPA
Speaks Out on The Patentability of Computer-Related Subject Matter, 64 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 434 (1982).
46. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
47. In Diehr the Supreme Court allowed patent application claims for a method of
operating a rubber-molding press. The method included constant measurement of the
temperature data and repeated calculation by a computer of a well-known mathematical
formula incorporating the data. Id. at 179-80 n.5.
In Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), the Court rejected a claim for a method of
calculating a temperature "alarm limit" at which a catalytic conversion process would be
shut down. Id. at 585-86. A computer was to perform the calculations that would be used
in an industrial process, but the patent claim itself merely recited and explained the
formula. Id. at 596-98. The Court determined that the only point of novelty was "a new
and presumably better method for calculating alarm limit values," id. at 594-95, and analogized the claim to an attempt to patent the formula used in calculating the circumference of a wheel. Id. at 595. In the Court's view, such a patent would grant a monopoly on
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computer hardware as machines. Thus, an invention described as a
computer containing certain software is more likely to be found patent48
able than the same software standing alone.
2.

Copyright Protection

In contrast to their uncertain status under patent law, copyright
law clearly protects computer programs embodied in source or object
code. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright "subsists" in works of
authorship and takes effect on creation of the work.4 9 Copyright historically has applied to literary works, works of art, music, and artistic performances. The definition of a "copy" has been amended, however, to
include works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium, even those
that cannot be perceived without the aid of a machine.50 This amendment appears to confirm that copyright may protect both human-readable source code and machine-language object code; the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit so held in Apple Computer,Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp.51 Both systems and applications programs
have been held subject to copyright protection. 52
an uninventive application of a "phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula." Id. at
594.
In Diehr the only novel aspect also was the improvement in the speed of calculating a
well-known equation in a standard industrial process. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 179. Arguably,
the only distinction between the cases is that Diehr's claim described an improved industrial process that involved computerized computations, whereas Flook's described only the
computerized computations themselves. See Milde, supra note 45, at 435-39.
48. See Note, supra note 2, at 1733-35.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
50. See id. In 1978, the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), a commission created by Congress in Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1373, recommended that copyright law be amended "to make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent that they embody an author's original creation, are proper subject matter of copyright." CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
Congress adopted many of CONTU's recommendations in amending the Copyright Act in
1980, in an attempt to clarify the copyright status of computer software. Act of Dec. 12,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3028; see H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6460, 6482. The 1980 amendments added a
definition of "computer program" to § 101, repealed existing § 117, which had made computer programs subject to legal principles developed under the 1909 Copyright Act, and
enacted a new § 117 to give "owners" of copies of computer programs limited authority to
use, adapt, or reproduce those copies for certain purposes. (CONTU had recommended
that this authority be extended to "rightful possessors" of copies; see CONTU REPORT,
supra note 12, at 30). See J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.07, at 41; infra notes 276-88 and accompanying text.
51. 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). The Apple
Computer decision appears to have resolved with compelling logic a split of authority on
the copyright status of object code. See id. at 1247-49.
52. Id. at 1253-54; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523
(9th Cir. 1984) (operating system subject to copyright protection).
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Although documentation distributed with a program is subject to
the same copyright protection as other literary works, the protection of
user languages is wholly uncertain. On the one hand, it is clear that a
document listing the elements of a language or describing the rules for
its use is a copyrighted literary work. On the other hand, if one merely
uses the language, or even writes a program that accepts an identical
system of user commands, it is difficult to say that the copyright in an
indentifiable "work of authorship" has been infringed, even if the result
is the appropriation of something that the programmer views as propri53
etary to him.
The copyright holder has the exclusive right to "reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies" and "to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work." 4 "Derivative work" is defined broadly to
include subsequent works "based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation . . . or any other form in which a work may be
55
recast, transformed, or adapted."
The application of this apparently straightforward Copyright Act
language has been far from simple. For example, under the 1909 Copyright Act, which did not reserve to the author the right to create derivative works, the word "copies" was construed to include paraphrases and
works bearing a close structural similarity to the copyrighted work,
even though not using the original's actual language. 56 Although arguably obviated by the inclusion of the derivative work concept, this broad
57
interpretation of copying has persisted in cases under the current Act.
Moreover, copyright protects only expression, not the ideas being expressed.58 Drawing the line between idea and expression has proved to
be perhaps the most vexatious problem in the long history of copyright
law.

59

53. Copyright protection for user languages is discussed infra notes 289-324 and accompanying text.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (2) (1982).
55. Id. § 101.
56. See Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689-90
(S.D.N.Y.) (paraphrase of textbook), aff'd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974); Donald
v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970) ("paraphrasing is
equivalent to outright copying"); Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Hanson Publications, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (paraphrasing of text of guitar instruction
book).
57. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1192-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing "total concept and feel" of competing works); Synercom Tech.,
Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012-13 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (recognizing
longstanding doctrine that similarity in form, arrangement, and combination of literary
elements may constitute infringement).

58. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-05 (1879); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
59. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1] (1984).
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Taken literally, the current Copyright Act's definition of "derivative work" appears to provide expansive protection. If the copyright
holder has the exclusive right to prepare works "based upon" or representing recastings, transformations, or adaptations of the original,6 0 that

right would prohibit virtually any borrowing from the original in creating a subsequent work.61 Although this expansive interpretation of derivative work may squarely conflict with the statutory prohibition
against extending copyright protection to ideas, 62 the courts have given
little guidance on whether the definition of derivative work is to be ap63
plied literally.
The Copyright Act authorizes broad relief. The Act" and associated Supreme Court rules6 5 provide for impounding infringing works
before, during, or after trial. The Act itself authorizes equitable relief
"on such terms as [the court] may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright." 66 The Act also authorizes actual
damages and disgorgement of an infringer's profits,6 7 as well as statutory damages up to $50,000 for willful violations 68 and reasonable attor69
neys' fees.
3.

Trade Secret Protection

Neither patent nor copyright law protects pure knowledge or abstract concepts. Both protect, in varying degrees, the expression, manifestation, and use of ideas. Protection of knowledge and concepts is left
largely to state trade secret law.
60. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2) (1982).
61. For example, a work borrowing its characters and its theme from an existing
work plausibly could be characterized as "based upon" the original. Borrowing at this
level, however, usually has been characterized as a permissible appropriation of ideas
rather than expression. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 951-52 (9th Cir. 1954) (appropriation of "Maltese Falcon" characters and
theme), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955). The related "scenes a faire" doctrine provides
that if certain elements of plot and character development can be expressed in only a limited number of ways, substantial similarity of expression is not necessarily infringement.
See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, Inc., 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976).
62. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-05 (1879); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
63. Cf. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (7th Cir. 1983) (exclusive right to prepare derivative works extended to "speeded up" versions of copyrighted
videogames).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982).
65. Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States for Practice and Procedure under Section 25 of an Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, approved March 4, 1909, reprintedin 4 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, app. at 12.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1982).
67. Id. § 504(a)(1), (b).
68. Id. § 504(a)(2), (c).
69. Id. § 505.
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The most widely cited definition of trade secret is articulated in
comment b to section 757 of the Restatement of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives
him an opportunity7 0 to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it.
The same comment states that "[t]he subject matter of a trade secret
must be secret. '71 The secrecy, however, need not be absolute; "a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of im'72
proper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information.
The Restatement suggests examining six factors to determine whether
particular information is a trade secret:
(1) The extent to which the information is known outside of his [the
proprietor's] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees
and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or
difficulty with which
the information could be properly acquired or du73
plicated by others.
Many courts have adopted these suggested factors. 74 A few courts also
have required the purported trade secret to have an element of
75
novelty.
The following practices are among those employed to ensure the
requisite "substantial element of secrecy": requiring employees to sign
employment agreements acknowledging the confidentiality of certain
information and prohibiting use of such information during employment and for a period of time after termination of employment; 76 safekeeping of confidential documents; 7 7 limiting access by outsiders and all
70. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). This section and other sections
dealing with business torts were not included in the Second Restatement. See also UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAw,
1973 COMMITTEE REPORTS 179-82, reprintedin 12A BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, MILGRIM ON
TRADE SECRETS app. A (1983) [hereinafter cited as MILGRIM].

71. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 757.
74. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 2.01, at 2 n.2. For an application of the Restatement test to alleged trade secrets in a computer program, see Cybertek Computer Prods.,
Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020, 1023 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977).
75. See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971); Sarkes
Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 257-59 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 283 F.2d
695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
76. See Lowndes Prod., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 329-30, 191 S.E.2d 761, 765-66
(1972); 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 3.01.
77. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 2.04; 12A MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 7.07[1][a].
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but necessary employees to confidential documents and sensitive plant
areas; 78 disclosing sensitive information to third parties only pursuant
to written confidentiality agreements; 79 and monitoring security
80
breaches.
Given the process by which it is created, a complex computer program appears eligible for trade secret protection.8 ' At every level of abstraction, the programmer must make decisions that affect the ultimate
success or failure of the program.8 2 To the extent that such decisions
are maintained in substantial secrecy, they appear to constitute a
"formula, pattern .

.

. or compilation of information which is used in

one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."83 Thus, to the extent
that copyright law may not protect the ideas and concepts that the program embodies, trade secret law may.
Pursuant to section 757 of the Restatement, any person who uses or
discloses the trade secret of another is liable for misappropriation if "(a)
he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) the disclosure or use
constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him."'8 4 Acquisition by improper means usually occurs through industrial espionage or breach of a confidential
relationship.8 5 Disclosure in breach of a confidential relationship may
occur when a partner uses the trade secret of a partnership for personal
advantage, 86 or when an employee or other party to whom a trade secret has been disclosed for business reasons uses the secret in violation
of an express 87 or implied confidentiality agreement.88 Significantly, it
is not a defense that a competitor might have learned the protected information from lawfully acquired sources; the relevant inquiry is what
89
the defendant did, not what someone else might have done.
78. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 2.04.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020, 1022
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1977); Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30
EMORY L.J. 483, 492 (1981) (citing 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, §§ 2.06, 2.09[A]; Duncan,
supra note 7, at 395-400).
82. See supra notes 2-20 and accompanying text.
83. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
84. Id. § 757.
85. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970)
(aerial photography of unfinished plant); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F.
Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (use of trade secrets that were disclosed in confidence), rev'd in
part sub nom. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
86. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 5.03[7].
87. See id. § 3.05[1].
88. See id. § 3.03.
89. See K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 602-03,
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When trade secret protection is sought for computer programs that
are widely distributed to users, there is an inherent tension between the
requirement of secrecy and the fact of distribution. Wide distribution of
software does not foreclose trade secret protection, as long as each recipient is party to an agreement that creates a confidential relationship
and substantially limits disclosure of those aspects of the software
deemed proprietary. 90 Thus, software generally is distributed only pursuant to license agreements. 91 Software license agreements typically
define broadly the trade secrets that the program embodies, require the
licensee to acknowledge the existence and protected status of those
trade secrets, prohibit use or disclosure of the software beyond what is
necessary to carry out the product's intended purpose, and prohibit
copying of the software or any accompanying documentation except for
92
legitimate backup purposes.
Courts formulating remedies in trade secret cases tend to follow
general principles of equity. 93 In part because the products often are
complex, the cases are difficult to reconcile and offer little help to a
lawyer attempting to predict the outcome of his own case. 94 It is particularly difficult to predict when one who has misappropriated a trade secret will be enjoined from distributing a product that allegedly
embodies it.95 Even when a court issues such an injunction, the length
314 S.W.2d. 782, 787-88 (citing Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1953)), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
90. See J & K Computer Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1982) (citing
Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)); cf. Videotronics,
Inc. v. Bend Elecs., [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,579 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 1984) (distinguishing J & K and finding no trade secret because of unrestricted distribution).
91. In J & K Computer Sys. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982), plaintiff informed
its employees and customers that its accounts receivable program was secret and noted on
each copy of the program that it could be used only when authorized by license. Because
of these measures, the court found the program protectible even though its contents were
revealed to certain customers. Id. at 735.
92. See 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 4A.07[1].
93. See, e.g., Bridge C.A.T. Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 710 F.2d 940, 946 (2d Cir.
1983); K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 606, 314
S.W.2d 782, 790 (1958).
94. Compare Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936)
(wrongdoer may be enjoined permanently from use or disclosure even though a subsequently issued patent makes the information public) with Schreyer v. Caseo Prods. Corp.,
190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951) (disclosure in patent precludes liability for use of information
after patent issued) and Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150
(2d Cir. 1949) (injunction can remain in effect only as long as trade secret remains secret).
95. Courts in trade secret and patent cases sometimes refuse injunctions that would
harm disproportionately the infringer. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK
AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES-CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY 159 (1981); see e.g., Forest Labs, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D.
Wis. 1969) (damages sufficient to compensate plaintiff when trade secret process had been
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of time it is to remain in effect and the scope of its coverage are difficult
problems that are resolved on a case-by-case basis. 96 These difficulties
are exacerbated when the trade secret has been made public by legitimate means after the alleged misappropriation but before trial,9 7 or
when the defendant can demonstrate that the product sought to be enjoined uses both the misappropriated trade secret and his original
contributions. 9
Finally, possible preemption of trade secret protection for software
must be considered. Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976
provides:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified
by sections 102 and 103 ...

are governed exclusively by this title ....

No person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State.99
Section 301(b)(1) further provides that "[n]othing in this title annuls or
limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any
State with respect to . . . subject matter that does not come within the
subject matter of copyright . . . ."10 Section 301(b)(3) also excludes

from preemption "activities violating legal or equitable rights that are
not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106."101 Although the courts have not

yet construed section 301 definitively, 10 2 the language and legislative
history of the section suggest that it was intended to abrogate only the
made public by declarations in plaintiff's patent), rev'd in part sub noma. Forest Labs, Inc.
v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
96. See supra note 95; see also Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md.
1958) (broad injunction necessary when entire operation was built on plaintiff's techniques, methods, materials, and design).
97. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202, 211 (E.D. Wis. 1969),
rev'd in part sub nom. Forest Labs, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
98. See Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923-24 (D. Md. 1958).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
100. Id. § 301(b)(1).
101. Id. § 301(b)(3).
102. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has construed 17
U.S.C. § 301 (1982) in dictum to preempt previous law and "replace the labyrinth of statutory and common law authority with a single, generally applicable federal statute." Roth
v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 938 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1983). Prior to the 1976
Act, the Supreme Court had held that the Copyright Clause in the United States Constitution did not vest in the federal government the exclusive power to grant protection in
the nature of copyright. In Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), the Court held that
a California statute designed to prohibit record piracy did not violate the Supremacy
Clause by conflicting with federal copyright law. Id. at 561-70. For a general discussion of
the preemptive effect of the 1976 Copyright Act on the common law of trade secrets, see

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VI

common law of copyright. 10 3 Accordingly, common-law protection
should remain available for ideas and concepts, which are excluded
04
specificially from federal copyright protection.
A series of Supreme Court decisions on the interaction of federal
patent law and state trade secret and unfair competition law supports
this interpretation. Between 1964 and 1974 the Court expressed and
then retreated from the view that state law could not protect unpatentable inventions because they were in the public domain.10 5 In the most
recent of these decisions, the Court concluded that "the patent policy of
encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of another form
of incentive to invention. In this respect the two systems [patent and
06
trade secret law] are not and never would be in conflict.'
4.

Summary

Every computer program includes source and/or object code in
which a copyright subsists. There is no persuasive reason not to take
the procedural steps necessary to take full advantage of Copyright Act
protection. Since a software developer will also likely claim proprietary
rights in intellectual contributions other than writing code, he should
complement copyright with licensing and other forms of trade secret
protection. Nonetheless, in cases involving alleged misappropriation of
a program, copyright infringement is likely to be a major issue. The remainder of this Article discusses some of the specific problems likely to
be encountered in computer copyright litigation.
II.

Procedural Prerequisites to Copyright Litigation

A plaintiff attempting to prove copyright infringement must meet
certain procedural prerequisites and then prove the required substantive elements. Procedurally, the plaintiff must have registered the
copyright 10 7 and, if not the copyright's original owner, have recorded
the instrument of transfer vesting the copyright in the plaintiff. 08 The
Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,579 (D. Nev. Apr.
26, 1984); Davidson, supra note 7, at 407-11.
103. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-33, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5745-49.

104. See Davidson, supra note 7, at 407-09.
105. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co v. Stiffel Co., 376

U.S. 225, 230-33 (1964).
106.
107.
108.
U.S.C.

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1982).
See Burns v. Rockwood Distrib. Co., 481 F. Supp. 841, 846-47 (N.D. Ill. 1979); 17
§ 205(d) (1982); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.08.
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plaintiff must have standing' 09 and must have brought the action within
the appropriate statute of limitations."i 0 Finally, the court must have
12
jurisdiction over both the subject matter"' and the defendant.
A.

1.

SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

Registration and Recordation

The plaintiff may not initiate an action for copyright infringement
until he has registered the work in the Copyright Office,11 3 or at least
attempted to register and been refused."14 Registration requires submission of an application, a small fee, and a "deposit" of two complete
copies of the "best edition" of the work." i5 The Copyright Office prefers the deposit of a computer program's source code, but will accept object code under the so-called rule of doubt."i 6 In either case, "special
relief" may be available to protect the confidentiality of trade secret
materials." i 7
Registration is only a prerequisite to initiating the action, not the
existence or validity of the copyright." 8 Thus, once the plaintiff has
registered or attemped to register the copyright, he may sue for infringements that occurred both prior to and after registration."i 9 If the
109. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.02.
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1982).
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.01[A]-[B].
112. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.01(C].
113. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1982).
114. Id. A plaintiff has made a sufficient attempt to register if he has delivered the
deposit, application, and fee in proper form to the Copyright Office, which has refused registration. See id.
115. See id. § 408.
116. The Copyright Office states that its examiners cannot determine whether copyrightable authorship exists by reviewing object code. See Copyright Office Literary Section Code Letter 70; Copyright Circular Rbl. Since the Copyright Act specifically extends
protection to works of authorship that can be perceived "either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device," 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982), this positon may be an unwarranted administrative narrowing of the scope of copyright protection. See also id. § 410(a)-(b) (Copyright Office either must issue or refuse registration.).
When a computer program has been published in the United States in machine-readable form only, the Office will accept a deposit of "identifying portions" in lieu of the complete work. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (1984). Such materials must be in a "form
visually perceptible without the aid of a machine," and usually must include the first and
last 25 pages of the program equivalent material. Id.; see also id. § 202.19(5) (no Library of
Congress deposit required for programs published in machine-readable form only).
117. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(d) (1984). If source code is deposited under the "identifying
materials" provision, the materials deposited should be able to be organized to exclude
trade secrets.
118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 201(a) (1982) provide that copyright vests in the author of the
work when the work is fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
119. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.08.
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plaintiff is not the author of the work, he also must record in the copyright office the instrument of transfer under which he asserts owner120
ship of the right allegedly infringed.
2.

Standing to Sue

The owner of the copyright and any assignee or exclusive licensee
of any right arising out of the copyright all have standing to sue to the
extent of their respective interests at the time of infringement.1 2 1 A
nonexclusive licensee does not have standing to sue and must rely on
1 22
his licensor to initiate the action.
Under the current Copyright Act, the owner of a copyright may assign or grant an exclusive license in some, but not all, of the rights arising out of the copyright, and thus, multiple parties may have protected
rights in a single work that was infringed only once. 123 A plaintiff
should identify specifically the right infringed and the date of infringement to demonstrate that he is the appropriate party to bring the suit.
3.

Statute of Limitations

The plaintiff must initiate any action for copyright infringement
within three years of the date on which the claim accrued. 124 Since the
claim does not accrue until the infringement actually occurs, the plaintiff must identify specifically the act or acts that constitute infringement.125 If an act of infringement occurred within the prior three
years, a suit for damages arising out of that act will not be barred, even
if the statute of limitations does bar a suit for other, earlier infringe126
ments of the same work by the same party.
Any equitable ground recognized under federal law, such as estop120. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1982). The statutory language appears to require that only
the most immediate instrument of transfer be recorded and not other instruments in the
chain of title to the author. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.08.
121. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.02. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982) provides only
that the "legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright" may sue. The
section defines an "exclusive right" as including the rights of a copyright holder set out in
§ 106.
122. See Hoffman v. Santly-Joy, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 779, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); 3 M. NIMMER,
supra note 59, § 12.02.
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1982). This section is the first explicit statutory recognition of the principle of divisibility of copyright. Id., Historical and Revision Notes.

124. See id. § 507.
125. See Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1981); 3 M.

NIMMER, supra
note 59, § 12.05.
126. See Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1977); Ro-

sette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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pel 27 or fraudulent concealment, may toll the limitation period.' 28 A
state tolling statute in the jurisdiction of the action, however, is not suf29
ficient to toll the statute.1
4.

Jurisdiction

The federal district courts have exclusive original subject matter ju1 30
risdiction over actions for the infringement of a statutory copyright.
The state courts have jurisdiction over actions to enforce, invalidate, or
rescind contracts, as well as actions for breach of warranty, even though
the validity of a copyright or the existence of infringement may be an
issue.' 31 State courts also have jurisdiction over any other claims for
the infringement of common-law copyright. 32 In determining whether
it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant in an infringement ac33
tion, a court will apply general principles of federal jurisdiction.
III.

Special Problems in Computer Copyright Cases
A.

INFRINGEMENT GENERALLY

The two classic elements of a copyright infringement case are the
validity of the copyright and the existence of copying. i 34 A copyright is
valid if the work is appropriate copyright subject matter'3 5 and an original work of authorship.' 36 Registration of the copyright and issuance of
the registration certificate within five years after the work's first publication is prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the
127. See Herald Square Music Co. v. Living Music, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1241
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.05.
128. See Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1977).
129. See Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1971).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection, and copyright cases."

131. See Condon v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 287 N.Y. 411, 40 N.E.2d 230 (1942); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.01[A]. Cf. Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp.
253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (federal court does not have jurisdiction over action to determine ownership of copyright).

132. See Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir. 1975); Hearst Corp.
v. Shopping Center Network, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 551, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Common-law
copyrights, by definition, do not arise under the Copyright Act. Since no common-law
copyright can arise for any work created after January 1, 1978, it is unlikely that commonlaw copyright will be an issue in future computer program cases.

133.
134.
135.
136.

See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.01[C].
See id. § 13.01.
17 U.S.C. §§ 102-105 (1982); see 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.01[A].
17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1982); see 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.01[A].
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facts stated in the certificate. 13 7 The court may, but is not required to,
give evidentiary weight to a certificate of registration first recorded
more than five years after the work's first publication.1 38 Once the
plaintiff establishes prima facie proof of the validity of the copyright,
1 39
the burden shifts to the defendant.
As noted earlier, a computer program in source- or object-code
form, whether stored on a tape, disk, ROM, or other medium, is subject
to copyright protection.' 40 Both systems and applications programming
are protected, and the user's interaction with the program and contribu41
tion to the output should not affect the protection.'
Direct evidence of copying, by admission or eyewitness testimony, is
often unavailable.' 42 Thus, courts have long allowed copying to be
proved circumstantially by showing access to the infringed work and
substantial similarity between the original and allegedly infringing
works. 143 It usually is not difficult to demonstrate access. The defendant may admit it, or may be shown to be a purchaser or licensee of the
program.'" In some cases, the court may presume access if the plaintiff's work is readily available on the market. 45 Defining substantial
similarity, however, has proved to be one of the most difficult problems
in cases dealing with literary works. The problem promises only to become exacerbated in the computer context.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
138. See id.
139. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.01[A].
140. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
141. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frankin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249-54 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704
F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 1S83); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-57 (2d Cir.
1982).
142. Direct evidence of copying a computer program, however, may be more readily
available. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d
Cir. 1983) (defendant admitted copying each work for which infringement alleged), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). See infra notes 324-50 and accompanying text; supra
notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
143. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d. 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981).
144. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp. 672 F.2d. 607, 614
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
145. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 146 (D.N.J. 1982);
cf. Selle v. Gibb, No. 83-2482 (7th Cir. July 23, 1984) (striking similarity may be circumstantial evidence of access).
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B.

PROVING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY

Generally, the substantial similarity test "is whether the accused
work is so similar to the plaintiff's work that an ordinary reasonable
person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the
plaintiff's protectible expression by taking material of substance and
value. '146 As another court has put it, substantial similarity exists
when "an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as hav147
ing been appropriated from the copyrighted work."
1.

The Standard for Evaluating Similarity

Most courts determining whether two works are substantially similar have evaluated them from the perspective of the hypothetical ordinary lay observer; "analytic dissection" and expert testimony generally
are not favored for this purpose. 148 Other courts, particularly the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits, have
applied the following two-pronged inquiry:1 49 First, is there enough
similarity to infer that the defendant copied at all? Second, is the copying extensive enough to constitute a misappropriation of the plaintiff's
work? 150 Under this approach, dissection is permitted in answering the
first question but the second is answered from the perspective of the ordinary lay observer. 151 With either approach, the courts permit expert
testimony and dissection on the issue of whether the misappropriated
152
portions of the plaintiff's work are subject to copyright protection.
The process of proof is relatively straightforward in the typical lit146. Atari, Inc v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
147. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir.
1982).
148. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d. 607,
614 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
149. See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 138
(D.N.J. 1982). The Ninth Circuit sometimes has varied this approach, requiring an "extrinsic" or "objective" showing that the two works are similar in idea, and then an "intrinsic" or "subjective" showing that they are similar in expression. See Litchfield v.
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1984); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 1977); cf. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982) (in videogame case,
court refers to two-part test, but focuses inquiry on reaction of ordinary lay observer),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
150. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, 546 F. Supp. 125, 138 (D.N.J. 1982).
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 615 (7th Cir. 1982) (If the works are similar only in an abstract idea not subject to
copyright protection, there is no substantial similarity or infringement.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1983).
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erary case. The competing works are put before the trier of fact who,
assisted by descriptive testimony, determines such things as the extent
153
of line-by-line copying and the overall similarity of the two works.
Expert testimony may be introduced on such specific issues as whether
the plaintiff's work merely restates mathematical formulas, laws of nature, or other matters in the public domain.1M
It is difficult, if not impossible, to apply these standard copyright
principles to a computer case, primarily because an ordinary lay observer often is incapable of comparing line by line two sets of computer
source or object code. In the rare case of verbatim copying the ordinary
lay observer might be able to detect it simply by comparing the two sets
of code side by side. 155 Such relatively minor changes as the translation
of the plaintiff's code from one computer language to another or the reversal of the order in which a program carries out certain calculations,
however, may render the two works materially dissimilar to the lay observer. Because either of these changes could be made mechanically
and neither change necessarily would vitiate copyright liability, 156 the
ordinary-lay-observer standard may have limited utility in computer
cases.157 In several cases, the trier of fact determining source code similarity therefore has relied on otherwise disfavored expert testimony and
58
analytic dissection.'
153. E.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.) (Judge
Learned Hand discusses copyright protection of play), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. E.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir.
1983) (copying admitted), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
156. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,1013 n.5
(N.D. Tex. 1978).
157. If such mechanical changes rendered the competing works superficially dissimilar, the lay observer would be unable to draw reasonable inferences about common origin.
158. The legal significance of alleged but disputed source-cede similarity was litigated
in SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Nos. 82-3669 & 82-3670 (M.D. Tenn. filed
July 30 & 31, 1982) (consolidation of separately filed cross-actions), which was tried by
Professor Conley, one of the authors of this Article. SAS Institute alleged that a new S &
H product infringed its copyright and that S & H had violated a license agreement in creating the product. S & H challenged the validity of SAS Institute's copyright, denying
both breach of the license and copying. The court summarized the facts in a partial summary judgment order of July 25, 1983, which dealt with the license issues and the copyright status of an earlier version of the product that allegedly was copied. S & H
Computer Sys. v. SAS Institute, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). The copyright
issues were tried to the court in September 1983, and a decision recently was handed
down. See infra notes 364-79 and accompanying text. At trial, each side presented testimony from several experts, both in-house and independent, on whether certain similarities in the source codes of the two products supported an inference of copying.
The United States International Trade Commission also relied on expert testimony
on the significance of source code similarity in Certain Personal Computers and Components, [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
25,651 (ITC Mar. 9, 1984). The Commission
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How Much Similarity is Enough?

There are no reported decisions in which a court has judged the
substantiality of alleged but contested similarities between two sets of
computer source code.15 9 In perhaps the most widely publicized computer copyright case, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp.,160 copying was admitted, and in the frequently cited case of
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.,'16 the similarity at issue was between elements of input and output. Thus, to determine how much similarity is "substantial" in a software case, it is
necessary to begin with principles developed in other contexts. First,
"[a]n infringement is not confined to literal and exact repetition or reproduction; it includes also the various modes in which the matter of
any work may be adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with
more or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy.' 1 6 2 The defendant's work need only "have captured the 'total concept and feel'"
163
of the plaintiff's work.
Second, substantial similarity does not require literal, line-by-line
identity; as Judge Learned Hand put it,
heard expert testimony on whether certain source code similarities constituted "substantial similarity," and ultimately issued an order banning the importation of several computer products. Id. at 18,931-32.
Other software infringement cases in which expert testimony was permitted on various issues include Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 n.6 (3d Cir.
1982) (evidence of copyright notice buried in object code, object code identity, and presence of identical errors in competing programs); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp.
741, 752-53 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (evidence of object code identity); and Hubco Data Prods. Corp.
v. Management Assistance Inc., [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb.
3, 1983) (evidence of defendant's creation of infringing copy as step in the operation of its
product).
159. See supra note 158; cf. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752-53 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (evidence showed 89% identity at object code level; court found similarity to be
substantial). In a number of cases involving videogame programs, the courts have considered substantial similarity, but have focused on the similarity of the displays produced by
the program rather than the programs themselves. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic
Int'l, 704 F.2d. 1009, (7th Cir. 1983) (audio and video images produced by videogame programs "virtually the same"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d. 607, 608 (7th Cir. 1982) (video images
produced by videogame programs, "uniquely similar"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
160. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
161. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
162. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1947); see
also Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("exact reproduction"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
163. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970)); see Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th
Cir. 1947).
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We have often decided that a play may be pirated without using the dialogue.... The play is the sequence of the confluents of all these
means [all the elements of the story and performance], bound together
in an inseparable unity; it may often be most effectively pirated by
leaving out the speech, for which a substitute can be found, which
keeeps the whole dramatic meaning. 164
Thus, one who borrows only the content and sequence of the scenes in
the play, thereby replicating its "dramatic meaning," may infringe the
copyright in the play.
Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.16 5 illustrates the
flexibility of the substantial similarity doctrine. Plaintiff published a
leading psychology textbook. Defendant initially identified plaintiff's
book as the leader in the field and decided to use it as a model. 166 Defendant's employees then scrutinized plaintiff's book and outlined it in
detail. 16 7 This outline was given to a second group of employees who
did not have access to plaintiff's work. 1 68 This group wrote a book that
directly plagiarized only eleven percent of plaintiff's book and contained "some independent ideas, .

.

. some independent research, some

additional topics, and some differing structure.' 1 69 Notwithstanding the
originality and the insulation of defendant's actual writers from plaintiff's book, the court found infringement in the form of "an extensive
taking of the structure and topical sequence of the [plaintiff's] book in
addition to the eleven percent of the [plaintiff's] book admittedly
'170
plagiarized.
Third, courts regularly have focused on the overall pattern of similarity; if the similarity is pervasive, differences in detail may be viewed
as immaterial. The test most frequently cited is whether "the ordinary
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed
to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.' 171 In
yet another of his sibylline dicta, Judge Learned Hand put it more succinctly: "[N]o plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of
his work he did not pirate."' 172 The rationale for the rule, Judge Hand
164. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 669 (1936).
165. 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.) (preliminary injunction granted), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221
(2d Cir. 1974), permanent injunction granted, 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
166. Meredith Corp., 413 F. Supp. at 385.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 387.
170. Id. at 386.
171. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); see
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982).
172. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d. 49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 669 (1936).
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noted elsewhere, is that otherwise "a plagiarist would escape by imma1' 73
terial variations.'
No quantitative or other precise standards govern the determination of substantial similarity. Courts have made determinations for
such diverse works as dolls, 174 fabrics,1 75 textbooks, 176 and plays and
movies. 177 These courts have been consistent in only one point: if it
would be unmistakably clear to a lay observer that the defendant used
the plaintiff's work as an explicit and comprehensive model for the defendant's work, regardless of the details of comparison, the works are
substantially similar.
The fourth point is a corollary of the third. Just as a plagiarist cannot excuse himself by showing how much he did not copy, neither can
he excuse himself by demonstrating that he has made independent contributions to his otherwise infringing work. Substantial similarity is
only circumstantial evidence of copying, which can be overcome by
proving that the accused work was created independently and that the
similarity is merely incidental. 178 The similarity, however, must be incidental to the independent creation; minor independent creation incidental to comprehensive similarity will not exonerate the defendant. The
Meredith Corp. court rejected a defense based on the inclusion of "some
independent ideas ....
research ....
topics ....
and . . . structure,"
finding that despite these contributions the overall similarity of the
works was sufficient to support an inference of copying. 79 Moreover,
that the plagiarist has expended substantial time and effort is irrelevant. In a recent videogame case, the court rejected evidence offered by
the defendants of "independent creation of the physical elements of
their games.' 80 Such evidence, the court concluded, "depicts only creation, not independent creation."''
As the court noted somewhat tartly,
"even the infringer who traces the outline of another's work must move
173. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
174. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir.
1982).
175. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
176. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.)
(preliminary injunction granted), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974), permanent injunction
granted, 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
177. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1936).
178. Cf. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 147 n.22 (D.N.J.
1982) (court rejected claim of independent creation of videogames).
179. Meredith Corp., 413 F. Supp. at 387.
180. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-American, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 147 n.72 (D.N.J.
1982).
181.

Id.
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his own hand across the page."1 8 2
Last, substantiality also has a qualitative aspect. As a federal judge
experienced in copyright matters recently pointed out to one of the authors, a finding of substantial similarity to the works of Shakespeare
would seem unwarranted if the alleged plagiarist had copied only a single line from the vast Shakespearean corpus. If, however, that line hap183
it
pened to be "a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,
would be reasonable to conclude that the plagiarist had appropriated
something of real substance.
4
Although the focus in most cases is on quantitative comparison,18
some courts have recognized the significance of qualitative similarity.
One district court stated that including some of Charlie Chaplin's "best
scenes" in an infringing film would support a finding of substantial similarity even if the quantitative similarity was limited.1 8 5 As the trial
judge in that case put it, "I would think there would be a substantial
taking of Gone with the Wind if somebody just took the burning of
1 86
Atlanta.
These five considerations arguably are mere variations on the pervasive theme of idea versus expression. Most copyright cases in which
some degree of similarity is found ultimately are resolved by determining whether the demonstrated resemblances lie in the realm of idea or
expression.1 8 7 Whether the works are similar enough to prove infringement, for example, is related to whether the similarities are sufficiently
detailed to prove misappropriation of expression. Similarly, qualitative
similarity is significant because a single line ("a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet," "the quality of mercy is not strained," for example) indeed can capture the essence of an author's expression. The plagiarist should not be exculpated by having included original expression
182. Id.
183. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act II, scene ii.
184. See, e.g., Meredith Corp., 413 F. Supp. at 387 (11% of textbook); Certain Personal
25,651 at 18,931-32 (ITC
Computer and Components, [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
March 9, 1984) (line-by-line quantitative comparison of computer source code similarities);
see also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.03[A][2], at 13-36 to -37 (discussing difficulty of
determining quantum of "fragmented literal similarity" allowable).
185. Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), affd, 672 F.2d. 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); see also Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947) (" '[I]f... the labors of
the original author are substantially, to an injurious extent, appropriated by another, that
is enough to constitute infringement.'") (quoting West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1909)).
186. Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
187. E.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607
(7th Cir. 1982) (videogames), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (cartoon characters).
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in his infringing work since the more pertinent question is whether he
has appropriated another's expression.
Substantial similarity and its permutations, although perhaps analytically neat, have been imprecise at best in application.l1s Although
there is little or no precedent,1 8 9 this imprecision only will be compounded when courts consider computer programs rather than literary
works.
Judges and jurors will be comparing works written in a language
and idiom incomprehensible to most of them. Absent identity of the
competing works, expert opinion inevitably will guide the determination of similarity. 19° Although courts can mitigate the problem by appointing their own experts, 191 in many instances they may have to rely
uncritically on the application by partisan experts of a legal conceptsubstantial similarity-to the facts. 192 If judges and jurors cannot evaluate the overall similarity of computer programs, then they will have
even more trouble determining whether a particular dissimilarity is exculpatory, evaluating the importance of an alleged infringer's independent contributions, and assessing the qualitative significance of a portion
of a program. Overall, the trier of fact is likely to have great difficulty
determining where in the programming process the boundary between
idea and expression lies.
It will be argued in section V of this Article that the Copyright Act
above all is a statute proscribing certain behavior. Thus, if the ordinarylay-observer test is obsolete in computer cases, the focus should shift
from the appearance of the competing works to the alleged infringer's
actual behavior. Given the iterative nature of the programming process
188. Compare, for example, the district and appellate court opinions in Atari, Inc. v.
North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1265 (M.D. Ill. 1981),
rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983), in which the courts
compared two videogames. Much of what the court of appeals found to be borrowing of
expression had been found to be borrowing of ideas by the district court. See generally
Jones, supra note 33 (discussing difficulty of distinguishing idea from expression in
videogames).

189. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 618-19 n.12 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
191. In S & H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983), the
court retained a statistical computing expert from Vanderbilt University who was nominated and paid jointly by the parties. He attended the pretrial hearings, conferences, and
trial. Prior to trial, the experts for the two sides submitted written reports to him.

192. In a literary case, the trier of fact can examine generally the competing works,
with or without the aid of experts, and make a largely subjective judgment whether any
observed similarity is "substantial."

If the very act of observing the competing works is

meaningless to the trier of fact, the court may have to delegate to the experts not only
observing the works and identifying similarities, but also the ultimate determination of
whether such similarities are "substantial."
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and the record-keeping it often engenders, evidence of the defendant's
behavior is likely to be more extensive and better preserved than in the
typical literary case. 193 Expert testimony can be used to prove whether
the defendant engaged in any conduct prohibited by the Act rather than
to evaluate substantial similarity. Before this argument is developed,
the intervening sections will review several other general principles of
copyright law that have assumed particular importance in computer
cases.
C.

THE IDENTITY OF IDEA AND EXPRESSION

"Where idea and expression are indistinguishable, the copyright
will protect against only identical copying . . . . 'The idea and the expression will coincide when the expression provides nothing new or additional over the idea.' ",194 If the idea and its expression are interwined
so closely that the particular idea can be expressed in only one form,
copyright protection is vitiated. 195
The "idea-expression defense" originated in Baker v. Selden, 19 6 a
case in which the Supreme Court held that a copyright in a book
describing a bookkeeping system did not preclude use of the system itself, even if that use required reproduction of charts and forms in the
book. The Court reasoned that the idea of the system was inseparable
from the expression of the idea in certain bookkeeping forms; to protect
the forms therefore would preempt use of the system.1 97 Lower courts
have recognized the defense in rejecting claims of infringement of sim193. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Earlier versions of the defendant's
program, for example, may repeat errors present in the plaintiff's program. See McClure
& Sher, Evaluating Claims of Software Copying Through Data Analysis (Part I), 3
SOFTWARE PROTECTION 8, 10-11 (July 1984).

194. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616
(7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
195. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 1303[A][1], at 13-32-33. To protect the expression in such cases would preempt the idea being expressed. E.g., Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (no copyright protection when idea capable
of only "a limited number" of forms of expression).
196. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
197. The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right to
make, sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plans set forth in such
book ....
... In describing the art, the illustrations and diagrams employed happen to
correspond more closely than usual with the actual work performed by the operator who uses the art ....

But the principle is the same ....

The description

of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself.
Id. at 104-05.
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ple designs,"' written game rules, 199 and pictorial representations on
game boards. 2° ° Many defendants in videogame cases have contended,
generally without success, that the games are similar because of the
limited number of ways to express the idea of frantic escape from a
voracious insectile creature. 20 1 Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act now
20 2
codifies the defense.
The sparse software copyright case law suggests the potential for
203
this defense. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
Franklin, the admitted copyist, attacked the copyright of Apple's operating system on several grounds, including the alleged identity of the
2° 4
In Franklin's view,
idea and the expression embodied in the system.
198. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)
(bee-shaped pin).
199. Durham Indus. Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1980); Affiliated
Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1975).
200. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 228-30 (D. Md. 1981).
201. Id; see also Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672
F.2d. 607, 616-17 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussion of "idea expression unity"), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1983); cf. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 148 (D.N.J.
1982) (rejection of contention that "idea of ... game actually includes the physical characteristics of the characters").
202. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) provides:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.
The House Report makes clear the purpose of § 102(h):
Nature of Copyright. Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or
information revealed by the author's work. It pertains to the literary, musical,
graphic, or artistic form in which the author expressed intellectual concepts. Section 102(b) [subsec. (b) of this section] makes clear that copyright protection does
not extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs
should extend protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the
programmer, rather than merely to the "writing" expressing his ideas. Section
102(b) [subsec. (b) of this section] is intended, among other things, to make clear
that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a
computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the
program are not within the scope of the copyright law.
Section 102(b) [subsec. (b) of this section] in no way enlarges or contracts the
scope of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in
the context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5670.
203. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), revg 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), cert. dismissed,
104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
204. Id. at 1252-53. Franklin also challenged the copyright status of object code embedded on a ROM (read-only memory) chip, id. at 1249, and argued that an operating system
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the pertinent idea apparently was "to enable a computer to run the vast
body of Apple-compatible

software.

' 20 5

Apple's operating programs

were not protected by copyright, Franklin contended, because they represented one of only a "limited 'number of ways to arrange operating
20
systems'" to achieve this end.

6

In responding to this argument, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit identified the pertinent inquiry as "whether the
idea is capable of various modes of expression ....

[I]f other programs

can be written or created which perform the same function as an Apple's operating system program, then that program is an expression of
the idea and hence copyrightable. '20 7 Because of an inadequate factual
20 8
record, the court remanded this issue for further consideration.
The court of appeals' treatment of Franklin's idea-expression defense is noteworthy in several respects, although it leaves unresolved at
least one major issue. First, the court rejected Franklin's argument
that, for purposes of determining the separability of idea and expression, an operating system differs somehow from other works of authorship. Franklin suggested that because the operating system causes the
machine to run and is purely utilitarian in purpose, the system is nothing more than an idea in operation, more closely akin to a patentable
process than copyrightable expression. 209 The court interpreted the
statutory language strictly and characterized as "perhaps the most convincing item leading us to reject Franklin's argument" the fact that section 101 of the Copyright Act, which defines "computer program,"
"makes no distinction between application programs and operating programs. '21 0 The court also relied on the conclusion of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works. "'Programs
should no more be considered machine parts than videotapes should be
considered parts of projectors or phonorecords parts of sound reproduction equipment ....

That the words of a program are used ultimately

in the implementation of a process should in no way affect their
was a "method of operation," and thus not subject to copyright protection. Id. at 1250-51.
The court of appeals rejected both of these arguments. Id.
205. Id. at 1253. "Apple-compatible software" includes both programs created by Apple and those created by others that will run on Apple computers. Generally, two computer systems are "compatible" when programs written for one will run on the other. For
a discussion of IBM's competitors' efforts to achieve compatibility with the IBM Personal
Computer, see Davis, IBM PC Software and Hardware Compatibility, COMPUTER LAW.,
July, 1984, at 11.
206. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1250-51; cf. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101 (1982) (patentability of processes).
210. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1252 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
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copyrightability.' "211 It can be intuitively appealing, particularly to one
unacquainted with programming, to view an operating system or other
program as too mechanistic to be protected as a work of authorship.
The court's conclusion, however, that the plain language and legislative
history of the statute require a different approach is persuasive.
Second, the court refused to allow Franklin to define itself out of
the infringement. Franklin premised its claim of entitlement to the
idea-expression defense on the assertion that "there are limited number
of ways to arrange operating systems to enable a computer to run the
vast body of Apple-compatible software. ' 212 Franklin seemed to argue
that complete Apple-compatibility (that is, the capability to use Apple
programs on the Franklin machine) was Franklin's "idea," which it
could achieve only by copying Apple's object code.2 1 3 The court of appeals, however, properly recognized that the relevant idea of each operating system program is the function that it was intended to perform"for example, how to translate source code into object code. 2 1 4 The
dispositive issue then is whether there are alternative means of achieving these various functional ends. The larger goal of compatibility was
characterized as "a commercial and competitive objective which does
not enter into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular
' 215
ideas and expressions have merged.
The idea-expression defense may be abused if a defendant per211. Id. at 1252 (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 21). The court treated the
CONTU REPORT as legislative history of the 1980 computer-related amendments to §§ 101
and 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act, "since Congress wrote into the law the [CONTU] majority's recommendation almost verbatim." Id.; see Pub. L. No. 96-517, §10, 94 Stat. 3015
(1980) (amendments incorporated the definition of "computer program" into the Copyright Act). The district court drew a different conclusion from the legislative history, focusing on a then inconclusive congressionial debate over copyright protection for design
patterns imprinted on computer chips. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 545 F. Supp 812, 819 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1982); cf.Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, § 303, 98 Stat. 3356 (adding new ch. 9 to 17 U.S.C.)
(creating new forms of protection for semiconductor "mask work").
212. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
213. Id. The district court described Franklin's argument somewhat more explicitly:
Franklin's goal was to create an operating system that would properly execute any program that would run on an Apple computer, and to ensure that a
user who had used Apple programs on an Apple computer would notice no difference in using the Franklin. Whether complete compatibility of operating systems
can be achieved by independent creation will depend largely on the complexity of
the system being emulated and its manner of solving particular programming
problems. Straightforward solutions often can be replicated independently; more
convoluted solutions may have to be copied to achieve complete compatibility.
Id. See Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARIZ.
ST. L. J. 611, 671 (final report of an American Bar Association committee on software
protection).
214. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
215. Id.
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suades a court to define the "idea" so narrowly that the defendant's
copy of the plaintiff's work is truly the only possible expression of that
idea. As the court in a recent videogame case stated, "The 'idea' of any
work could always be defined in such detail that the description of the
expression would add nothing to the 'idea,' thus allowing a defendant to
engage in all but verbatim copying. '"216 "Such a ploy," the same court
'2 1 7
observed, "cannot be allowed.
Although the argument apparently was neither well developed nor
well received in Apple Computer, it might be more plausible in other
circumstances. Consider a plaintiff whose applications programs have
wide user acceptance. Hypothesize further a defendant attempting to
develop a lower-cost program, functionally similar to the plaintiff's program, that accepts user input in the same way as the plaintiff's program
and delivers identical output. Finally, assume that the source code of
the defendant's program closely resembles that of the plaintiff's program, and that the defendant had access to the source and object code
2 18
of the plaintiff's program while writing his own.
The defendant does not contest access, nor does he contest substantial similarity. Conversely, he stresses it. He identifies his "idea" as the
achievement of one hundred percent user-level compatibility. The only
question, he contends, is whether there is more than one way to achieve
such compatability, and he contends that there is not. He argues that
the plaintiff is trying improperly to foreclose competition by extending
a copyright monopoly into an area where idea and expression have
2 19
merged.
How should the court respond? It is likely to be aware, or at least
informed by the defendant, that achieving compatibility with the hardware and software of other manufacturers is an industry in itself, and
220
that it has had the salutary effect of reducing consumer prices.
Would the court be stifling a recognized form of competition by rejecting the idea-expression defense? Or would acceptance of the defense dilute necessary copyright protection? 22 1 Would the resulting
216. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 128 (D.N.J. 1982).
217. Id.
218. This hypothetical is drawn from an argument made in S & H Computer Sys., Inc.
v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). See supra note 158.
219. The recent opinion in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th
Cir. 1984), analyzed the antitrust implications of a copyright monopoly.

220. See Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1984, at 25, cols. 1-2.
221. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp 125, 148 (D.N.J. 1982)
("The idea of any work could always be defined in such detail that the description of the
expression would add nothing to the 'idea,' thus allowing a defendant to engage in all but

verbatim copying.").
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precedent permit even the admitted plagiarist to escape through rationalization and special pleading?
Although the court in Apple Computer rejected defendant's theory
that its "idea" was compatibility, it did so peremptorily and without detailed analysis. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas approached the problem somewhat differently in
22 2
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.
In Synercom the input formats used in a structural engineering
analysis program were at issue. 223 The formats specified the manner in
which the user's data were to be entered into the computer. Synercom
had provided the user with forms to facilitate entering data in the ap224
propriate formats, and had registered a copyright in the forms.
Although the forms themselves resembled blank business forms more
than literary works, the court recognized that the formats embodied in
the forms were the product of substantial intellectual effort:
"Synercom conceived their logic and arranged their sequence. '225 Using
this logic and sequence, an engineer who formerly had needed three different programs to perform certain structural calculations now could
perform the same calculations in a more sophisticated manner with
226
only a single program.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had infringed by furnishing the
users of their competing system with instructions to enter data in a sequence identical to that called for by the Synercom forms.227 Although
defendants did not actually copy and provide the Synercom forms, their
222. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Plaintiff asserted several state-law claims, including unfair competition, a year later. The court declined to grant the relief sought,
finding that federal copyright law preempted it. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 38 (N.D. Tex. 1979); see infra notes 318-22 and accompanying
text.
223. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1007-09. Synercom also argued that defendants had copied substantial portions of its printed manuals. Id. The court upheld the copyright in the
manuals, found copying, and ordered defendant to account for infringing materials al-

ready published and to desist from further infringement. Id.at 1014-15.
224. Id. at 1007-09. The opinion often uses "form" and "format" interchangeably. In
particular, the court discusses the copyright status of both the "formats" and the "forms"
without distinguishing betwen the two. Id. at 1007, 1011. "Format" technically should re-

fer, however, to the logic and sequence the user follows in entering data, whereas "form"
should refer to the printed cards that guide the user to structure and enter the data correctly. An examination of the exhibits in the case reveals that the forms were cards with
lines and spaces arranged in a particular fashion. The only words on the forms were column headings across the top. The dispute might have been framed more clearly if the
forms had been treated as the expression of the idea of input sequencing-the expression
of the formats.
225. Id. at 1007.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1008, 1012.
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instructions did include a "mirror image" of the Synercom forms. 228
Defendants' instructions ensured complete compatibility with the
Synercom program, since a user accustomed to the Synercom entry formats could use defendants' program without any reinstruction or
229
rehabituation.
The court initially rejected defendants' contention that the input
forms communicated no information and thus could not constitute the
copyrighted expression of an idea. 230 In an interesting logical exercise,
the court emphasized that defendants' manual used a "mirror image" of
the Synercom forms to instruct users how to format input data. Since
the forms were instructive, the court reasoned, they must convey infor231
mation and thus constitute expression.
Having determined that the input forms constituted expression, the
court next addressed the "closely related" arguments that defendants
had borrowed only the ideas expressed in the forms, or to the extent
that defendants had borrowed expression, it was inseparable from the
underlying ideas. 232 The court accepted both arguments.
The court analogized the ideas embodied in the forms to the figureH pattern of an automobile stick shift.233 Although an automobile manufacturer's description of the stick shift would be subject to copyright
protection, a second manufacturer would be free, at least for copyright
purposes, to appropriate the idea. The second manufacturer also could
write its own description of the stick shift, "however similar [it] may be
to the first manufacturer's materials. ''234 Thus, substantial similarity of
the two descriptions would be irrelevant for copyright purposes, as long
as the second manufacturer had borrowed the unprotected idea and
then independently developed its own expression of the idea.
The court concluded that defendants had not borrowed any of
Synercom's protected expression. Rather, defendants had appropriated
the ideas embodied in the input forms (the logic and sequence) and ex228. Id. at 1009, 1012.
229. Id. at 1008-09, 1012.
230. Id. at 1011-12. The court contrasted the blank bookkeeping forms in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), which conveyed no information and thus were not protected by
copyright, with the test answer sheets in Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937),
that had been held to convey information. The court found the input forms more similar
to the latter. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011-12.
231. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011-12. Later in the opinion, the court retreated somewhat from this conclusion. Id. at 1014.
232. Id. at 1012-14. The lack of distinction between "forms" and "formats" is particularly confusing in this part of the opinion. Defendants apparently argued that any expression embodied in the forms was inseparable from the idea of entering data in particular

formats.
233. Id. at 1013.

234. Id.
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pressed these ideas in their instructions. That these instructions caused
the user to enter data according to the Synercom format and that the
defendants' instructions contained a mirror image of the Synercom
incidenform did not give rise to copyright liability because these were
235
tal, if inevitable, results of borrowing the unprotected ideas.
In an important footnote, 23 6 the court compared defendants' actions
to reading another programmer's manual, borrowing the manual's ideas
to use in a second program, and then writing a manual about the second
program. The court stated that such a process would not violate the
copyright in the first manual, regardless of any ultimate similarity between the manuals. Translating a computer program into another language would be a violation, however, as would be converting a "detailed
description of a particular problem solution, such as a flow chart or
step-by-step set of prose instruction," into a computer program.2 37 In
Synercom defendants merely had borrowed an idea, and then, working
independently, followed that idea to its logical conclusion; the result
might have been different, the court intimated, if defendants had copied
238
from Synercom's program.
Finally, the court held in the alternative that even if defendants
had copied expression, it was coextensive with the ideas being expressed and thus would not be protected. If the only expression on the
Synercom forms was the order and sequence of inputs, that expression
would not be subject to copyright protection because it was "not separable [from the underlying ideas], for the form, arrangement and combination is itself the intellectual conception involved. '239
Given the facts that the court faced, the decision probably was correct. It is difficult to separate the idea of entering data in a certain sequence from the expression of that idea in a form that arranges the
data appropriately. This factual context differs from the Apple Computer situation, in which the idea was the performance of particular
functions by a computer and the expression was a complex set of instructions written by a programmer to cause the machine to carry out
that function. The Synercom opinion, however, does have broader implications for the idea-expression defense when a defendant has attempted to achieve compatibility with a plaintiff's software.
First, Synercom states clearly that achieving compatibility is not itself a copyright violation. Copyright liability does not result from the
235. Id. at 1012.
236. Id. at 1013 n.5.
237. Id.
238. "Hence [defendants'] preparation of a FORTRAN preprocessor program from the
descriptions contained in the manuals cannot constitute an infringing use provided this
was done without copying of the plaintiff's FORTRAN program, as it was." Id.
239. Id, at 1014.
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second program duplicating the functions of the first or the users of the
second program going through the same input and output procedures as
the users of the first. In fact, according to Synercom, substantial similarity between the two user's manuals and, perhaps, the two source
codes may not even give rise to liability. The pertinent questions are
whether the alleged infringer achieved similarity by borrowing the
ideas and the functionality of the first program and by independently
writing his own program and supporting documentation or whether he
worked from the plaintiff's code or a highly detailed description of the
code.

24 0

Although Synercom states clearly that compatibility itself will not
give rise to liability, it is less clear whether a defendant who asserts that
his goal is compatibility but admits copying original expression will be
exonerated. The court premised its holding on a finding that defendants had appropriated, at most, unprotected ideas; it indicated that the
result would have been different if defendants had copied Synercom
code or a detailed outline of the Synercom program. Although this
proposition appears straightforward, the significance of the term "idea"
is uncertain. The borrowed idea in Synercom may have been the concept of compatibility. Defendants' apparent goals-to duplicate the
functions of the Synercom program and to permit users to enter and receive data in the same manner as with the Synercom program-support
this interpretation. 241 If this interpretation is correct, the opinion may
suggest that infringement occurs if a defendant borrows detailed programming expressions, even if pursuing compatibility.
The court, however, seems not to have viewed the borrowed idea as
having such broad implications. Rather, it seemed to interpret the idea
in functional terms, as did the court in Apple Computer.242 The
Synercom court's mechanical analogy and its use of language such as
"sequencing and ordering of data ' 243 suggest that the court read nothing more into the "idea" than the arrangement of data, and that it did
not make the logical jump from the specifics of data arrangement to the
240. In footnote 5 the court commented that the preparation of a computer program in
any language from a description of the problem to be solved (even if that description was
written "in sufficient detail and with sufficient precision to enable it to be converted into
an unambiguous set of computer instructions") would be an independent creative act and
would not give rise to copyright liability for similarities at the code level. Id. at 1013 n.5.
The court drew a less-than-lucid distinction between this process and preparing a program
from a description that included "a flow chart or step-by-step set of prose instructions,
written in human language." Id. The latter program "would probably be a violation" of
the original program's copyright. Id.
241. Id. at 1008.
242. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
243. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013.

1985]

COMPUTER SOFTWARE LITIGATION

general concept of compatibility. 244 Thus, a more prudent interpretation of the case is that it leaves open whether pursuing compatibility is
a complete defense to unambiguous acts of plagiarism.
The most significant point in Synercom may be that the court
viewed the functional similarity between the two programs as not dispositive of the copyright issue, if not irrelevant to it. The court focused,
rather, on defendants' conduct, in particular whether they had used any
elements of Synercom's program in creating their own. 2 45 As noted
above, given the nature of programming, courts probably should focus
on conduct rather than attempt to apply the substantial similarity
test. 246 Section V suggests that a similar focus on conduct may help resolve the compatibility dilemma.
D.

SUBSEQUENT ALTERATIONS

If a particular version of the defendant's program is found to be
substantially similar to the plaintiff's program, or even if the defendant
admits copying some or all of a plaintiff's program, the defendant may
offer to alter his work prior to distributing it, or introduce evidence that
he already has done So.247 The defendant will argue that since the version of his work that will be marketed is not substantially similar to the
plaintiff's work, the defendant should not be held liable for infringement, regardless of similarity in earlier versions or other contrary
evidence.
This argument has had a mixed reception in the literary and artistic cases. Professor Nimmer's treatise supports the argument, stating
that "a defendant may legitimately avoid infringement by intentionally
making sufficient changes in a work which would otherwise be regarded as substantially similar to that of the plantiff's.1 248 The court in
one recent case relied on Nimmer in finding that defendant's doll did
not infringe plaintiff's doll, partly because of changes made by defendant to render the two dolls less similar. 249 In another recent case the
author of a novel sought to enjoin the broadcast of a television movie
244.
"idea"
245.
246.

In other words, the court did not consider the broader question of whether the
of compatibility excuses any copying of expression necessary to perform that idea.
See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.

247. In S & H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983),
defendant offered evidence that recent versions of the allegedly infringing program were

less similar. See supra note 158.
248. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.03 [B], at 13-43.
249. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 210 (11th Cir. 1981) (citing
M. NIMMER, supra note 59, for proposition that defendant may avoid liability by making
changes sufficient to avoid finding of substantial similarity).
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allegedly based on the novel. 25 0 The court rejected plaintiff's comparison of the novel to defendant's screenplay, holding that the movie as
broadcast was the only relevant evidence of infringement.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on the
other hand, rejected this argument in a case involving an alleged copy
of an ornamental screen. 25 ' In response to defendant's claim that it had
cured any infringement by changing the screen, the court pointed out
that "the starting point for [defendant's] 'redesign' was the plaintiff's
work. '252 The court determined that, given this essential fact, subsequent changes would not excuse the initial plagiarism; they merely
were "colorable alterations made to disguise the piracy." 253 In another
case, 254 plaintiff, named Davis, had written a dramatization of an Edith
Wharton novel, and defendants had produced and sponsored a television
play based on the same novel. Having found substantial similarity between plaintiff's novel and defendants' dramatizations of the novel, the
court examined defendants' efforts to "unDavis" the television script
prior to its broadcast. The court considered these efforts "too little, too
late and too transparent," but, perhaps significantly, never stated that
the attempt to "unDavis" the script was unavailing as a matter of
25 5
law.
There is no apparent way to reconcile these conflicting authorities.
The Nimmer view seems to follow logically from a somewhat mechani257
cal reading of the 1909 Act 256 and the substantial similarity case law.
If the plaintiff is trying to enjoin the distribution of an infringing work,
then the test should be (absent evidence of direct copying) whether the
work sought to be enjoined is substantially similar to the plaintiff's
250. Fuld v. National Broadcasting Co., 390 F. Supp. 877, 882 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
251. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
252. Id. at 284.
253. Id.
254. Davis v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
255. Id. at 620-21.
256.

Under § 1(a) of the 1909 Copyright Act, the exclusive rights of the copyright

holder included the rights "[t]o print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted
work." Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. Compare this language with that of
§ 106(1)-(3) of the present Act, 17 U.S.C. §106 (1)-(3) (1982), which grants exclusive rights:
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; [and] (3) to distribute copies." A semantic
argument can be made that the new Act, by replacing such terms as "print" and "vend"
with broader prohibitions against copying and preparing derivative works, focuses more

on the conduct of the alleged infringer and less on the commerical exploitation of the allegedly infringing work. In the reported cases, the Nimmer view seems not to have been

challenged on this basis.
257. See supra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
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work. The defendant should not be liable for his prior substantially
similar work since the plaintiff does not seek to enjoin that prior work.
This argument has two shortcomings, one equitable and one statutory. First, there is something inherently inequitable about permitting a
defendant to appropriate a plaintiff's creative effort, presumably saving
himself a great deal of time and money, and then to escape liability by
making cosmetic changes prior to distribution of the otherwise infringing work. 25 8 An unspoken appreciation of these equities may underlie
those decisions that view subsequent alterations as "too little, too late
'259
and too transparent.
Second, the argument favoring the defense seems to ignore that,
under the present Act, one of the copyright holder's exclusive rights is
to prepare derivative works. 26° A derivative work "is a work based
upon one or more preexisting works," including recastings, transformations, or adaptations of the original. 261 Although no cases are squarely
on point, the definition should include a work copied from an existing
262
work and then altered to disguise the similarities.
The fundamental flaw in the subsequent alteration defense, however, is that it treats substantial similarity as an end rather than a
means. Substantial similarity, after all, is only circumstantial evidence
of copying, to be used when no direct evidence is available. 263 There is
no a priori basis for treating it as the sole determinant of liability when
other forms of evidence are available. This approach is precisely what
those courts that have permitted exculpation by subsequent alteration
have done. To pursue the "unDavising" example, 264 is not defendants'
258. The defendent will argue, of course, that the superficial dissimilarities are evidence that he originally appropriated only the plaintiff's ideas.

259. Davis v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
260. 17 U.S.C. § 102(2) (1982). This right has no counterpart in the 1909 Act. The cases
had used the term "derivative work," but it referred to a second work that was sufficiently different from an earlier one to receive independent copyright status as a "derivative work." See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821,

830 (11th Cir. 1982) (copyright status of successive generations of dolls); Grove Press, Inc.
v. Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y.1965) (copyright status of original
French work and subsequent translations). Interestingly, some of the cases taking the
Nimmer view were decided after the January 1, 1978 effective date of the 1976 Act. See
supra note 249.
261. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
262. This logic is particularly compelling when at some stage in the derivation process
the defendant "copied" the plaintiff's work in the traditional sense. Cf. Hubco Data
Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983) (citing exclusive right to make copies, court issues preliminary injunction against Hubco
product that alters operation of MAI operating system, since at one stage Hubco product
creates copy of MAI object code).
263. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
264. Davis v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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attempt to "unDavis" their original script circumstantial evidence that
they copied plaintiff's play? Similarly, is it not relevant that defendants
considered an earlier version of their script even more similar to Davis'
265
play than the version actually broadcast?
To ignore prior versions of a work assumes that what the Copyright
Act prohibits is the distribution of a substantially similar work.
Although the language of the former Copyright Act may support such
an interpretation, the present Act, particularly in its expansive definition of derivative work, focuses on the defendant's behavior. Under this
view, the relevant question is whether it can be inferred from all the
available evidence that the defendant copied the plaintiff's work or prepared a derivative work based on it.
The equitable considerations supporting this view are particularly
compelling in a software copyright case. Once even a rudimentary version of the allegedly infringing program has been entered into a computer system that has text editing capabilities, a plagiarist can make
massive changes in the appearance of the source code in a matter of
seconds. 266 Consider again the example of a program designed to perform statistical calculations. Assume that a plagiarist has copied this
program verbatim. Using the text editing capabilities of most general
purpose computer systems, the plagiarist can make nonfunctional
changes in procedure and variable names, the order in which calculations are performed, the order in which variables appear within particular equations, and the manner in which particular categories of data are
represented in the program. None of these changes is particularly significant from either a statistical or programming standpoint; all can be
accomplished with minimal time and creative effort by the plagiarist.
Together, however, they may result in a source code that, at least from
the perspective of the lay observer, has little similarity to the original
work.
Many programmers believe that the most difficult part of programming is developing an initial, rough version of the code. This "working
draft" version need not accomplish the desired task accurately or efficiently, as long as it embodies a method for accomplishing the task that
a computer can execute. This version then can serve as a basis for elaboration, refinement, and, in some cases, wholesale substitution.
Although this initial version may bear little superficial resemblance to
the final one, many programmers find that once they have developed an
265. Cf. Meredith Corp v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 385, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("alterations [in textbook] to conceal obvious plagiarism" held to be evidence of copyright infringement).
266. One way to edit text is to use a word processing program to correct, reorder, and
reformat. Specially designed programs can make other, more complex changes in the

code, such as reordering a series of calculations. See Davidson, supra note 7, at 376-78.
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initial version the remainder of the programming process moves far
more quickly.

267

The initial draft may be of much greater practical significance
when writing a computer program than when writing a book. The initial draft of a book gets the ideas on paper. The author can posit and
reject alternative ways of expressing those ideas using little time or
money. Since the computer program is functional, however, the inital
version not only gets the ideas on paper but is a true working model.
To create that working model, the original programmer may have spent
much time and money developing and testing alternatives. 268 The computer plagiarist thus derives a tangible and substantial benefit from
avoiding those lines of inquiry which yield results that simply do not
work.
A defendant who can rely on the subsequent alteration defense can
use another's copyrighted program as an initial version of a second program. Such a defendant need only refine the first program. Regardless
of how extensive the process of refinement, 269 if the first program
"works" to some extent, the second programmer has been spared many
blind alleys. In some cases, the second programmer only may have to
make changes to avoid palpable similarities.
The defendant may argue that borrowing and changing is common
in the literary world and is merely the borrowing of unprotected
ideas.2 70 The defense only will apply, however, if the changes are extensive enough to preclude a finding of substantial similarity of the final versions. With a literary work, such changes likely will require so
much creative effort that little will remain of the first work but the
ideas it embodied. 27 1 With a computer program, by contrast, it sometimes requires limited creative effort to make alterations sufficient to
avoid readily apparent similarity. In that case, it is more accurate to
find that the defendant initially copied both idea and expression, and
then made changes to mask the initial borrowing of expression. Since
the second programmer may have made those changes more or less
267. See generally 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06 [3][e] (discussion of "debugging").
There was expert testimony to this effect in S & H Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS Institute,
Inc., 568 F. Supp 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). See supra note 158.
268. See 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, §2.06 [3][e].
269. The refinement process still may be difficult, but significantly less difficult than
starting from the beginning without a working model. See id.
270. But cf. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 385, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (defense rejected in literary context).

271. E.g., Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 724 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Defendants' movie Coming Home did not infringe copyright in plaintiff's novel, regardless of
similarites between novel and earlier screen plays.).
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mechanically, unlike his literary counterpart, he did not necessarily
substitute his own expression for that in the original.
Although there is little or no relevant case law, 272 the new Act's
definition of derivative work 273 again is helpful. If plagiarism followed
by disingenuous alteration is not the creation of an unauthorized derivative work, what is? The focus once again is on the defendant's conduct;
the relevant inquiry is whether he based his program on or adapted it
from a preexisting program. If the plaintiff shows that the defendant
initially appropriated both ideas and expression, derived substantial
benefit from doing so, and then made "colorable alterations . . .to disguise the piracy" 274 without contributing substantial original expression, it will be fully consistent with traditional copyright principles to
find the defendant liable because of his behavior.
E.

THE SECTION 117 DEFENSE

The current version of section 117 of the Copyright Act is another
potential problem in software infringement litigation. 275 This section
276
It
was added in 1980 to clarify the protection of computer programs.
provides that the "owner" of a copy of a copyrighted program does not
272. See infra notes 337-51 and accompaning text.
273. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2) (1982); see supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
274. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 928" (1970).
275. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982) provides:
Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used
in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may
be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such
copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights
in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
276. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980). The present § 117 was added as
part of a lengthy bill amending many provisions of the Patent Act. It is clear from the
House Report and Congressional Record, however, that Congress saw the 1980 copyright
amendments as a codification of the CONTU REPORT recommendations. See H.R. REP.
No. 1307, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460,
6482; 18 CONG. REC. H 10,767 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmaier); 18
CONG. REC. S14,761 (daily ed. Nov 20, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). CONTU recommended, however, that § 117 rights be extended to "rightful possessors," yet Congress'
version applies only to an "owner of a copy of a program." See supra note 50; CONTU
REPORT, supra note 12, at 30.
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infringe by making "another copy or adaptation" as long as it is an essential step in using the program on a machine or is made for archival
purposes only and destroyed when rightful possession of the original
program ends.
Current section 117 first was subjected to close scrutiny in Atari,
Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.277 Defendant JS&A sold a device that duplicated certain Atari and Atari-compatible videogames. In response to a
claim of contributory infringement, 278 JS&A claimed that its product
had a substantial noninfringing use--duplication of Atari games for archival purposes-as section 117 permits. 279 The court held section 117
inapplicable. It examined the CONTU Report and determined that the
narrow purpose of the archival copy exception was to protect a user
against "'destruction or damage by mechanical or electrical failure.' ",280
The court reasoned that since the primary threat to videogame car277. [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
25,613 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1983). The court in
Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450, 456 (D.
Idaho Sept. 18, 1983), similarly rejected a § 117 defense. The court granted a preliminary
injunction against a computer program that enhanced the functioning of a copyrighted operating system, because the infringing product, during execution, created an unauthorized
copy of the operating system. The court rejected the § 117 defense on the threshold basis
that the alleged infringer was not an "owner" of the operating system. Id.
More recently, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D.
Cal. 1984), plaintiff Apple Computer previously had obtained a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the defendant Formula from copying any of Apple's copyrighted programs
and from selling computer components that contained copies of such programs. On Apple's motion for contempt, the court found that Formula was continuing to sell computers
and computer kits that contained copyrighted Apple programs encoded on ROM chips.
Formula contended that it had lawfully purchased copies of the Apple programs on
"Wong diskettes," which had been produced with Apple's authorization. Id. at 620.
Formula concluded that since it was "'the owner of a copy'" of the Apple programs, it
could make and distribute the ROM copies as "'new copies ... created as an essential
step in the utilization of a computer program in conjunction with' a machine of its own."
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982)). The Court reviewed the CONTU REPORT and some of
the sources considered by CONTU, characterized Formula's invocation of § 117 as a "pretext," and held Formula in contempt. Id. at 622-23.
Finally, in MicroSparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984), the
court found infringement when a "typing service" copied programs from a computer magazine onto disks, duplicated the disks, and sold them to readers of the magazine. Id. at 34.
The court rejected the argument that § 117 authorized such conduct. The court cited and
followed the analysis of JS&A. Id. at 35.
278. [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25.613, at 18,695. The theory of the contributory infringement claim was that JS&A contributed to the making of unlawful copies by
the users of its product. The substantial noninfringing-use defense has its roots in patent
law, but a recent Supreme Court decision made clear that the doctrine is relevant in copyright as well. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 774, 789-90
(1984).
279. (1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,613, at 18,695.
280. Id. at 18,696 (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 31).
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tridges was physical rather than mechanical or electrical, defendant
could not invoke the archival copy exception. 28 ' Thus, the court did not
address whether the section ever could exculpate a defendant whose
purpose was to infringe or promote infringement.
Consider the buyer of a single copy of a copyrighted program, who
is thus the "owner" of that copy. Because he plans to develop a competing program, he makes a second copy of the copyrighted program to facilitate studying it. The copyright proprietor files suit, claims that the
making of the second copy violated his copyright, and seeks ultimately
to enjoin further work on the competing product. The user responds
that, regardless of his intent, the second copy serves an archival purpose
and thus is permissible under section 117.
The initial response must be that the presence of any nonarchival
purpose, however secondary, will foreclose the section 117 defense. Section 117 requires that the copy be "created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program" and that it be "used in no other
manner," or that the copy be created "for archival purposes only." Two
further questions, however, arise from this response.
First, how should "purpose" be defined? Does it mean subjective
purpose, so that an unconsummated plan (as in the hypothetical) forecloses the defense, or objective purpose referring only to actual
nonarchival or nonessential use? Although there are no cases no point,
the CONTU report 28 2 clearly implies that the sole purpose of section
117 is to provide to "[o]ne who rightfully possesses a copy of program
. ..a legal right to copy it to that extent which will permit its use by
that possessor. '283 The report does not suggest any intent to increase
the burden borne by a copyright plaintiff by providing a technical defense to one who intends to make other than lawful use of a program
that he rightfully possesses. Accordingly, courts should construe the
section as not providing a defense for one who has made actual use of a
copy other than the permitted operational and archival uses or has
made a copy that he plans to use impermissibly. Section 117 should not
exonerate a defendant who made a copy as part of an impermissible,
thwarted scheme merely because he could have put the suspect copy to
an archival use.
Second, who should bear the burden of proof on the propriety of
the defendant's activities? The court in JS&A treated section 117 as an
exception to the general principle that the making of unauthorized cop281.

[1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)

25,613, at 18,696.

282. JS&A is consistent with other cases in treating the CONTU Report as the legislative history of the 1980 computer-related amendments. Id.; see supra note 211.
283. CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 13.
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ies constitutes infringement. 284 Although the court did not state so explicitly, it seemed to view section 117 as an affirmative defense to a
prima facie case of infringement. The court concluded that the alleged
infringer bears the "burden of bringing itself within the section 117 exception." 28 5 Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case that an
unauthorized copy has been made, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove either that the copy was used exclusively for, and an essential
step in, the utilization of the program, or that the copy was for archival
purposes only. In the above hypothetical, the plaintiff would demonstrate that the defendant made an unauthorized copy, 286 and the defendant then would have to persuade the court that he had only one
purpose, permissible under section 117, and that his conduct was consis287
tent with that permissible purpose.
The legislative history and the CONTU report do not discuss the allocation of burden. Nevertheless, it seems fair to infer from both the
language of the section and the tone of the legislative history that Congress intended not to add to the burden borne by copyright holders, but
simply to identify limited circumstances in which users might meet
their technical needs without violating section 106's blanket prohibition
on unauthorized copying. 288 JS&A's allocation of the burden is consistent with this interpretation of the purpose of section 117.

F.

USER-LEVEL LANGUAGES

One of the most difficult issues that can arise in computer-related
intellectual property disputes is how to treat a system through which
the user interacts with the program, sometimes termed a user language.28 9 Such a language likely will include a lexicon of words and
symbols, some of which may be novel and others of which may come
from mathematics, logic, English, or an existing computer language.
The user language also will include syntactical rules for combining
these lexical elements, some of which again may be original and others
of which may be drawn from the rules of existing computer languages.
The components of the language system that arguably may be protected
are the screen displays that control input, the manuals sections that list
the lexical elements and the syntactic rules, and the language itself.
284. [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. 25,613, at 18,696.
285. Id.
286. In S & H Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS Inst. Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 422 (M.D. Tenn.
1983), several briefs mentioned the § 117 defense. The defense clearly was inapplicable,
however, since the alleged infringer was a licensee rather than an owner.
287. In other words, he would have to demonstrate both subjective and objective compliance with § 117.
288. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982); see supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 22, 30-32 and accompanying text.
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The input displays seem analogous to the displays that videogame
programs produce, which have been held subject to copyright protection
as audio-visual displays. 290 Videogame programs produce both "attract
mode" displays, which display typical game sequences when no one is
playing, and "play mode" displays, in which the user interacts with the
computer program to produce action sequences. 29 1 It has been held that
the user's contribution, through his moves and choices, to the final audio-visual product of the play mode sequences does not affect copyright
292
protection.
The input screens generated by an applications programs are logically indistinguishable from the displays generated by a videogame, particularly in the play mode. Both types of displays contain expression
that the program generates and invite participation in a particular manner by the user, all of which may determine the contents of further
displays.
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.,293 however, may suggest a different analysis and conclusion. One of
Synercom's alternative holdings was that input formats were not subject to copyright protection, in part because they merged idea and expression. 294 If the input screens from a particular program can be
analogized to the input formats in Synercom, the screens should not be
protected by copyright, regardless of any analogies to audio-visual displays, as long as there has been no copying of the program that generates the screens. 29 5 Under Synercom the idea underlying the input
screens is the arrangement of data in a particular format; the screen
merely expresses one of a limited number of means of achieving that
format.
The way to reconcile these conflicting views may be to focus on the
input forms that Synercom used. These forms were nothing more than
cards with blank spaces arranged in a particular sequence under column
290. E.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983); Atari,
Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir.

1982).
291. Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1982).
292. Id. at 855-56; see also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th
Cir. 1983) (player's contribution to production of images on videogame screen does not
render the images his work for copyright purposes).
293. 462 F. Supp 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
294. Id. at 1012-14.
295. See id. at 1013 n.5. A program used in preparing medical insurance claims would
generate a series of screens calling for a variety of information about the claimant. The
information entered in response to inquiries on one screen would determine the inquiries
on subsequent screens.
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headings; the manual instructed the user how to fill in the spaces. 296
Although the court found these forms to be expression (albeit indistinguishable from the underlying idea), they bore little or no resemblance
to the literary or artistic works usually encountered in copyright cases.
The court in Synercom perhaps was swayed by the lack of literary or
symbolic content in the forms, notwithstanding its protestations about
expression. Under this view, Synercom should be limited to its facts
and not applied to screens that not only arrange data but contain recognizable literary output.

29 7

The description and compilation of the user lanaguage in manuals
clearly seems protected. Copyright should protect the manual as a
book, including those portions listing the elements of the language or
describing its use. 298 Other compilations, such as the quick reference
cards often used with software manuals, should enjoy similar
296. Id. at 1007-08, 1011; see supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
297. Cf. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 52526 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (test answer sheets subject to copyright protection). Even if, under this
argument, copyright protects the input screens, it would not protect the logic and sequence of the input process, to which Synercom's stick shift analogy would apply.
Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
298. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) provides as follows:
Subject matter of copyright: Compilations and derivative works
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in
which such material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right
in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and
does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any
copyright protection in the preexisting material.
Copyright protection thus subsists in the portions of the compilation that the author contributed. The author may contribute by ordering items not themselves subject to copyright protection. E.g., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984)
(infringement of copyright in baseball card catalogue); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 672 F.2d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir.) (copyright in compilation of Charlie Chaplin film clips), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Mtg. Sys.
Inc., 591 F. Supp. 726, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (copyright in mileage numbers on highway
maps). The extent of copyright protection in a compilation of historical facts is controversial, and the Supreme Court recently has granted certiorari in a case involving President
Ford's memoirs. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3860 (May 29, 1984) (No. 83-1632). See generally Denicola,
Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for Protectionof Nonfiction Literary Works,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 576 (1981) (comprehensive review of compliation case law); Shipley &
Hay, Protecting Research: Copyright, Common-Law Alternatives, and Federal Pereemption, 63 N.C.L. REV. 125 (1984) (review of copyright and state-law protection for research
in nonfiction works).
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29 9

protection.
Here too, however, Synercom intrudes with a cautionary note.
Even if copyright protection subsists as described above, Synercom
notes that infringement occurs only when a work subject to copyright
protection, such as a screen or manual, has itself been copied. Another
programmer who uses the same language in his program will not incur
copyright liability by writing a manual for the use of his program, regardless of how similar his manual is to the one written by the original
30°
programmer.
This conclusion assumes, of course, that the language itself does not
enjoy copyright protection. There are at least two ways to approach this
issue. First, a series of early cases held that copyright protects compilations of code words. In Hartfield v. Peterson30 1 plaintiff's work was a
compilation of approximately 75,000 code words and phrases. Defendant attacked the work's copyright status, arguing that many, if not
most, of plaintiff's words and phrases appeared in other codes that were
in the public domain, which plaintiff virtually had admitted. 30 2 Judge
Learned Hand, writing for the court, rejected this argument, finding
that plaintiff's act of compilation was itself original. 30 3 Significantly,
the court held that the copyright extended both to the compilation and
to the individual coinages themselves to the extent that they were original: "Both the phrases, so far as they were his, and the arrangement
were proper subjects of copyright. ' 30 4 Moreover, the court noted that
the widespread use in business of some of the individual words and
30 5
phrases did not affect its holding.
Conversely, it has been held that copyright does not protect a system of taking shorthand.30 6 Nonetheless, Hartfield apparently represents the majority view; it is consistent with earlier cases involving
codes and symbolic representations,3 0 7 it was followed as recently as
299. Such cards typically list the most commonly used lexical elements. E.g., SAS 79.5

Reference Card (SAS Inst. 1981).
300. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013-14 (stick shift hypothetical).
301. 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937).
302. Id. at 999.
303. Id.
304. Id. It is difficult to determine precisely what the court meant by this statement,

particularly because the preceding sentence points out: "[T]he right protected by Hartfield's copyright was not to the use of the words found in the phrases, but to the many
arrangements ... which the author selected to express his idea." Id. (citations omitted).
See infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
305. Harfteld, 91 F.2d at 999.

306. Brief English Systems, Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S.
853 (1931).
307. The court had reached a similar conclusion in an earlier case involving another

book of coined code words. Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F.2d 717
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1971,308 and it was cited in Synercom.3 09
If Hartfield remains sound law, the analogies between a code and a
user language initially are persuasive. Both are collections of words and
symbols, borrowed and original, in which the symbolic system has
meaning only if a set of conventions is followed. If indeed a user language is analogous to a code, Judge Hand's conclusion that copyright
protected Hartfield's words and phrases would be significant;3 10 copyright then would protect the elements of the user language original to
the programmer, regardless of past use by others.
Application of the codebook rationale to a user-level language, however, results in a major logical gap. Section 106 of the Copyright Act
reserves several rights to the copyright holder, including the rights to
make copies and to prepare derivative works. 31 1 The offense in each instance is the unauthorized use of the copyrighted work. If a plaintiff
premises an infringement action on unauthorized use of a user-level
language in a competing work, how will he identify the infringed work?
If the defendant has copied a compilation or description of the language, the analysis is relatively straightforward (subject, of course, to
the Synercom caveats discussed above). Since a copyright may subsist
in a compilation, unauthorized copying of the compilation of a language
in a manual or on a reference card should violate that copyright. Similarly, copying a description in a manual is indistinguishable from copying any other book. The analysis is more difficult, however, if the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant developed a competing program that
accepts a language identical to the plaintiff's and wrote documentation
describing that language. Following Hartfield, the plaintiff will argue
that the copyright subsists in the elements of the language themselves,
and that the defendant violated the copyright by including these elements in his program and documentation. The defendant will respond
that the plaintiff cannot point to a "work" that has been misappropriated, but rather is seeking to protect either an idea or individual words,
312
neither of which copyright protects.
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1921) (L. Hand, J.). The same court also had suggested in dictum in another case that a copyright might subsist in a geometric design "'illustrating thought

processes and formulating scientific information in regard to same.'" Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727, 728 (2d Cir. 1929) (A. Hand, J.). The court found
in the latter case, however, that a photograph of the work did not infringe because plaintiff already had included drawings of the work in a patent application, thus placing the
work in the public domain. Id. at 729.
308. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 524
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
309. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011.
310. Hartfield,91 F.2d at 999.
311. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1), (2) (1982).
312. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (copyright protection does not extend to ideas); 37
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The defendant's argument is more persuasive. Abstractions do not
enjoy copyright protection; an infringer must infringe a protected work.
If the defendant merely writes a program that accepts the elements and
syntactical rules of the plaintiff's language, the defendant has not infringed a protected work.
Judge Hand, however, remarked in Hartfeld that "the phrases.
were proper subjects of copyright. '3 13 Although any statement by
Learned Hand in a copyright decision is not to be dismissed lightly, it
only can be inferred that the remark is aberrant dictum. The statement
was unnecessary to the decision since defendant had copied portions of
the compilation. 3 14 Moreover, it is plainly inconsistent with that most
venerable of copyright maxims: copyright protects only works of expression, not ideas and abstractions.
Second, Synercom also supports the theory that copyright cannot
protect a user-level language. The court concluded that copyright did
not bar one programmer from using input formats that another had developed, or independently producing descriptions of those formats. 3 15
In one important sense, a user-level language is a set of "input formats."
The language elements and syntax specify acceptable means for entering data, selecting options, and generating output-purposes similar to
those served by the input formats in Synercom. Synercom, therefore,
suggests that any expression embodied in a user-level language is indistinguishable from the underlying ideas of arranging and entering data
and controlling the program's operation.
There are differences, however, between the largely blank forms
used by Synercom 316 and a complex user-level language. As suggested
earlier, the differences between the forms and traditionally protected
literary expression may have influenced the Synercom court. 317 A user
language may be the culmination of a long process of designing and
manipulating elements of expression. The language must be intelligible
to the user, must be comprehensive and internally consistent, and must
direct the operation of the program.
Although this distinction may avoid the precedential effect of
Synercom, it does not solve the fundamental problem-the absence of
an identifiable protected work. This absence makes it unlikely that
copyright protection will be extended to the elements and syntax of
C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1984) (no registration of "[w]ords and short phrases"); 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 59, § 2.16.
313. Hartfeld, 91 F.2d at 999.
314. Id. The trial court found "a large number of substantially identical phrases that
are in the two codes and certain sequences of phrases."
315. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013-14 & n.5.

316. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
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user-level languages, notwithstanding Judge Hand's dictum. Copyright
may protect discrete manifestations of the language, including screen
displays, compilations, and description. Passing off and misappropriation claims asserted under federal trademark law3 1 8 and the statu-

tory 319 and common law of unfair competition, however, may be the
320
only means of protecting the language itself.

A plaintiff asserting

318. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Section 43(a) prohibits,
"words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent" the origin of goods or
services. In certain circumstances, misappropriation of another's user language arguably
could confuse customers about the origin of a software product.
319. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104(b)(1)-(4) (1984). These provisions of the
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act are similar to the Lanham Act in prohibiting practices that tend to create confusion about a product's source. Because one of the stated purposes of the Consumer Protection Act is to promote "good faith dealings between buyers
and sellers at all levels of commerce," id. § 47-18-102(4), it presumably is available to persons other than retail consumers. See id. § 47-18-109(a) (private right of action available
to "any person who suffers an ascertainable loss . . . as a result of the use of or by another person of an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared to be unlawful by this
part").
Other states have more general prohibitions against unfair or deceptive acts or practices. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1 (1984). Some of these states have created a private right of action for any person
injured by a prohibited practice, see, e.g., N.C. GEN STAT § 75-16 (1984), whereas others
have provided for an express private action for injured business people, see, e.g., MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1984).
320. See, e.g., United Van Lines, Inc. v. American Holiday Van Lines, Inc., 487 F. Supp.
235 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (Tennessee common law of unfair competition); Harrington Mfg.
Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 248 S.E.2d 739 (1978), cert denied, 296 N.C. 411,
251 S.E.2d 469 (1979).
In 1918 the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for misappropriation under
federal common law. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
The Court held that even though plaintiff news agency could not copyright the facts in its
news releases, defendant could not review the early editions of plaintiff's newspapers and
pirate the news to use as its own. Id. at 226. The Court reasoned that one who had
worked to obtain a product should be able to benefit from it, rejecting defendant's argument that published news articles belonged to the public, and considering instead the
plaintiff's and defendant's relative rights as competitors.
InternationalNews Serv. expanded unfair competition to include the act of misappropriation and eliminated the element of ultimate confusion of consumers. With the decline
of federal common law after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), some federal
courts have held that InternationalNews Serv. is no longer an independent source of a
claim of unfair competition. See Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 672 F.2d
1095, 1105 (2d Cir. 1982); Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 942 n.9
(W.D. Tex. 1982). Yet the Supreme Court has never overruled InternationalNews Serv.,
and several federal courts have cited it in allowing a common-law unfair competition
claim based on a misappropriation theory. See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
650 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing InternationalNews Serv. for misappropriation
theory); A & M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Dist. Corp., 574 F. 2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding plaintiff could obtain common-law relief); Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric
Co., 337 F.2d 716, 725 (4th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff entitled to recover under common law).
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such claims generally would have to demonstrate one of the following:
(1) the plaintiff's language is so closely identified with his product that
the defendant's use of the language tends to create confusion about the
source of the defendant's product, or (2) the defendant is reaping unfairly the benefits of the plaintiff's development and marketing. 321 The
use of any of these theories, of course, may be preempted under section
322
301 of the Copyright Act.
Some states have rejected the InternationalNews Serv. theory and limit unfair competition to misrepresentation; e.g., Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 317
Ill. App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165 (1943) (stating that the test is whether consumer will be
deceived); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F.
Supp. 198, 203 (D. Mass. 1942) (holding that Massachusetts courts would not follow International News Serv.); and others have cited InternationalNews Service in finding misappropriation. E.g., Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N.C. App. 20, 22 (1971)
(finding InternationalNews Serv. applicable).
321. A full discussion of these theories and their elements is beyond the scope of this
Article.
322. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). See supra notes 99-106 and 'accompanying text.
Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state statutory and common-law protection when:
(i) the nature of the work at issue is within the subject matter of copyright
as defined in §§ 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act; and
(ii) the rights granted under state law are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by § 106 of the Copyright
Act.
Accordingly, an unfair competition claim under state common or statutory law must concern either intellectual property not protected by copyright or be based on state rights
qualitatively different from the rights protected by the Copyright Act. Compare Rand
McNally & Co. v. Fleet Mgt. Sys., 591 F. Supp. 726, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (mileage figures on
highway maps entitled to copyright protection as compilations; process of compilation may
be entitled to state-law misappropriation protection) and Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp.
361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (ideas protected by state misappropriation law precisely because
they are not protected by copyright) and Leonard Storch Enters. Inc. v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (printing fonts denied copyright protection but granted alternate state protection) with Durham Indus. Inc. v. Tomy Corp.,
630 F.2d. 905, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1980) (unfair competition claim preempted) and Synercom
Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 42-43 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (state misappropriation doctrine preempted). In Durham Indus. a manufacturer of Walt Disney
character figurines sued for copyright infringement and unfair competition. The court, after rejecting the manufacturer's copyright claims because of lack of originality, also dismissed the unfair competition claim. Citing § 301 of the Copyright Act, the court stated
that a plaintiff cannot achieve with an unfair competition claim what he has failed to
achieve with a copyright claim, and held that the unfair competition claim was preempted
because it was based on a right equivalent to exclusive rights within the scope of copyright. Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 918-19. In Synercom the court had granted copyright
relief in an earlier decision, and it held that granting further relief under unfair competition for the same conduct would create an unacceptable conflict between state and federal
law. Synercom, 474 F. Supp. at 43. See generally Denicola, supra note 298, at 517 n.7 (review of copyright preemption doctrine and its effect on state-law theories); Shipley &
Hay, supra note 298, at 152-58 (same).
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Although it is unlikely that user-level languages will receive copyright protection, evidence of a defendant's appropriation of a language
still may be relevant in a copyright infringement case. The difference
between a literary work and a computer program dictates a parallel difference in the focus of an infringement case-rather than comparing
page by page the competing works, the defendant's conduct must be analyzed. If this premise is accepted, the defendant's appropriation of the
plaintiff's user language may be significant. Consider an admitted copyist who relies on the compatibility defense. The court must determine
whether copying to achieve compatibility is more like computer industry practices that should be tolerated, if not encouraged, so as to promote competition, or more like traditional literary plagiarism. 323 That
the defendant has appropriated the plaintiff's language, a product of
substantial creative effort, may have some practical impact on the
court's determination. Similarly, if the defendant claims that any codelevel similarities were incidental to his independent creation and the
case turns on the relative credibility of the parties, evidence of the defendant's appropriation of a user language may be significant.3 24 Thus,
although defendant may not be independently liable for appropriating a
user language, such appropriation nevertheless may be relevant in evaluating other acts of alleged infringement.
IV.

Substantial Similarity Revisited: A Focus on Conduct

This Article suggests in several contexts that the defendant's conduct should be the critical inquiry in software copyright litigation. Liability should not depend on substantial similarity between the
copyrighted work and a particular version of the allegedly infringing
work; rather, it should depend on whether the defendant has engaged
in conduct that infringes any of the plaintiff's exclusive statutory rights.
This view draws support from four important sources.
First, applying the substantial similarity test to a pair of computer
programs may be a meaningless exercise for a trier of fact not well
versed in computer programming. Trivial distinctions may disguise, to
the lay viewer, earlier line-by-line copying. Second, subsequent alterations may be much more significant in a computer case than a literary
case. Since a plagiarist sometimes can make alterations sufficient to
"disguise the piracy" 32 5 on a computer with little creative effort, and
323. See supra notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
324. Cf.Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 830 (11th
Cir. 1982) (court comments on defendant's "insatiable interest" in plaintiff's copyrighted
dolls).
325. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied. 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
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since such alterations may not substantially divest him of the advantage
he has gained from initially copying the plaintiff's program, there are
compelling reasons for not limiting the inquiry to the appearance of the
326
work that the defendant ultimately plans to distribute.
in
Third, several cases suggest indirectly that the appropriate focus 327
Peterson,
v.
Hartfield
In
conduct.
defendant's
the
is
case
a copyright
for example, defendant denied copying, even though many of his words
and phrases were identical to those appearing in plaintiff's book. The
court rejected defendant's denial, considering among other things, that
defendant had purchased a copy of plaintiff's work well in advance of
compiling his own. 3 28 Similarly, in Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc.,329 the original Cabbage Patch doll case, defendant
denied that he had copied the dolls produced by the now famous Xavier
Roberts. As part of its inquiry the court examined defendant's conduct,
emphasizing defendant's "insatiable interest in the production techniques of [plaintiff's] dolls," and finding that this "provided ample
grounds for the trial court's skeptical treatment" of defendant's claims
of originality. 330 Furthermore, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Third and Ninth Circuits have applied a two-part inquiry in infringement cases: they assess whether defendant has copied and then
3 31
evaluate the significance of any copying that has been detected.
Although these circuits and other courts ultimately have used the degree of similarity as the dispositive criterion, this two-step analysis nevertheless is consistent with the statutory focus on copying.
Last, courts should concentrate on the defendant's conduct because
of the language of the 1976 Act. Under the 1909 Act the exclusive
rights of the authors of literary works included the rights to print, reprint, publish, copy, vend, translate, or dramatize the copyrighted
work. 332 Section 106 of the 1976 Act includes among the exclusive

rights of the copyright holder the right "to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work. '333 Section 101 defines a derivative
work as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,. . . or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
' 's 34
adapted.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937).
Id. at 999.
684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 830.
See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; see supra note 256.
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
Id. § 101.
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The language of section 106 suggests that preparing a derivative
work includes more than just copying. If this language is taken literally, the defendant need not copy verbatim or even paraphrase the
copyrighted work, as long as he uses it and his resulting work can be
seen as "based upon" the copyrighted work. The legislative history,
although not extensive, is consistent with this interpretation. The
House Report notes that the exclusive right to prepare derivative works
"overlaps the exclusive right of reproduction to some extent. It is
broader than that right, however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a
derivative work . . . may be an infringement even though nothing is

ever fixed in tangible form. '3 35 The report also notes that, notwithstanding the breadth of the offense, "the infringing work must incorpo'336
rate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit squarely
contradicted this interpretation of section 106 in the recent motion picture case of Litchfield v. Spielberg.337 The court rejected the proposition that a plaintiff "does not have to show substantial similarity to
show that [the accused work] is a derivative work. '338 This holding,
335. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. News 5659, 5675.
336. Id.
337. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984).
338. Id. at 1357. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's movie, E T-The Extraterrestrial,
infringed the copyright in a 1978 play plaintiff had written. The court rejected a traditional copyright claim because of the absence of substantial similarity, id. at 1356-57, and
dismissed as "frivolous" plaintiff's argument that an unlawful derivative work need not
be substantially similar to the protected work. Id. at 1357. The court criticized the plaintiff for "cit[ing] no authority to support this novel proposition." Id. The principal authority, however, that the court cited to support its own position, Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v.
Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 720 F.2d
733 (2d Cir. 1983), cert granted, 104 S. Ct. 1676 (1984), appears not to be on point. In
Harry Fox, the court determined the respective rights of a composer and a music publisher under a previously terminated license and copyright assignment. The page that the
Spielberg court cited from the Harry Fox district court opinion states that "[a] work is a
'derivative work' if it is substantially derived from an underlying work." Harry Fox, 543
F. Supp. at 849. It does not state or "suggest," however, as the court of appeals contends,
that "a work is not derivative unless it has been substantially copied from the prior
work." Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357 (emphasis added). The other case that the court cites,
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
980 (1976), did use the "substantially copied" language, which it borrowed from NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT. See M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 3.01. Reyher was decided under the 1909
Copyright Act. Moreover, the issue discussed in Reyher on the page that the Spielberg
court cited was whether a book written by the plaintiff was sufficiently distinct from a
story in the public domain to be a derivative work subject to copyright protection.
Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357 (citing Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90). Reyher did not address the
offensive use of the right to produce derivative works proposed by plaintiff in Litchfield.
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however, should not be considered controlling or even persuasive in
computer software cases for two reasons. First, it is easier to disguise
339
original similarity between computer programs than between movies.
Second, the Litchfield holding is premised on the court of appeals' view
that substantial similarity is an element of the offense and not merely a
form of circumstantial evidence of copying. 340 Other courts do not follow this view and thus should find limited precedential value in
Litchfield's interpretation of section 106.3 4 1

The literal scope of the copyright holder's exclusive right to prepare derivative works must be limited, so that every borrower of an
342
idea is not threatened by the holder's "offensive" use of the right.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted a
practical approach in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc.343 Plaintiff was the licensor of the Pac-Man and Galaxian
videogames. Defendant sold a printed circuit board that would speed up
play when inserted into one of the plaintiff's Galaxian game machines. 344 After first discussing the validity of plaintiff's copyrights in
the games as audio-visual works,345 the court found that the entity the
consumer created by using both plaintiff's and defendant's products-a
speeded-up Galaxian game--constituted a derivative work as defined in
section 101.346 Defendant analogized the effect of its product to speeding up a phonograph record-a trivial activity that clearly would not
yield an infringing derivative work. 347 The court rejected the analogy
and, significantly, distinguished the speeded-up game from a speeded-up
record on economic grounds:
339. See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text.
340. See Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1355 ("To prove copyright infringement, the plaintiff
must show (1) ownership of the copyright, (2) access . . . and (3) substantial similarity
....
"); id. at 1356 ("To prove infringement, a plaintiff must show that the works are sub-

stantially similar in both ideas and expression.") (both citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 1977)). The Ninth
Circuit's view of the significance of substantial similarity is discussed supra note 149.
341. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. Litchfield's use of precedent is
also suspect. See supra note 338.
342. The phrase "offensive derivative work theory" refers to the use of § 106(2) to impose liability independent of the substantial similarity test. This use contrasts with the
older and more common "defensive" use of § 106(2) to determine the extent of copyright
protection for a second work that draws on a preexisting work. See supra note 260.
343. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
344. Id. at 1010-11.
345. The court found that the games were subject to protection, notwithstanding that
the user contributed to the final pattern of images. Id. at 1011-12; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
102(a)(6) (1982) (defining "motion pictures and other audiovisual works" and including
them in coverage of Copyright Act).
346. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1013-14.
347. Id. at 1013.
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[T]he additional value to the copyright owner of having the right to
market separately the speeded-up version of the recorded performance
is too trivial to warrant legal protection for that right. A speeded-up
videogame is a substantially different product from the original game.
As noted, it is more exciting to play and it requires some creative effort
to produce. For that reason, the owner of the copyright on the game
should be entitled to monopolize it on the same theory that he is entitled to monopolize the derivative works specifically listed in Section
101.348
The court determined that because the speeded-up game was a derivative work, the consumer "who lacks the plaintiff's authorization to create a derivative work is a direct infringer [under section 106(2)] and the
defendant is a contributory infringer through its sale of the speeded-up
'349
circuit board.
Thus, the court treated sections 101 and 106(2) as meaning what
they say: one who creates an unauthorized derivative work infringes,
and derivative works are not only the enumerated examples-such as
translations, dramatizations, and motion picture versions-but other
works not named in the statute that are similarly "based upon" the
original. 350 Most significantly, the court defined the category of derivative works using economic considerations. The court held that if, because the defendant has based his work on the plaintiff's work, the
limited monopoly that the Copyright Act confers on the plaintiff is frustrated substantially, the defendant has violated section 106; if the interference with the plaintiff's monopoly is economically trivial, the
defendant has not violated the plaintiff's exclusive rights, even though
the allegedly infringing work in some sense is "based upon" the
35 1
original.
V.

Conclusion: A Unifying Theory for Software Copyright Litigation

It often will be inappropriate in software cases simply to compare
the competing works to determine whether they are substantially similar. Rather, the technology dictates a focus on the defendant's conduct
and any advantage he has gained from it. This approach is implicit in
348. Id. at 1014.

349. Id. at 1013.

350. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
351. Midway used a similar argument in a suit against the producer of a Pac-Man modification kit. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In this case,
however, the court did not consider § 106(2) as an independent source of liability. It
found that defendant's product did not infringe Midway's audio-visual work copyright be-

cause the kit produced an audio-visual work not substantially similar to Pac-Man. Id. at
747-78. The court enjoined Strohon's kit nonetheless, partly on trademark grounds and
partly because it contained ROMs that infringed Midway's copyright in the Pac-Man object code. Id. at 749-54.
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many cases, and more importantly, is consistent with the statutory language and the limited case authority construing it.
Based on these practical and legal considerations, the following is
proposed as a unifying theory for software copyright litigation:
(1) The court should read the Copyright Act literally to prohibit
conduct inconsistent with the copyright holder's exclusive rights. The
court should not follow literary cases by concluding immediately that
no direct evidence will be available and that substantial similarity must
be the dispositive criterion. In a computer case, direct evidence not
only may exist, but it may be more useful than inferences drawn from
comparing the works.

(2) The court should look beyond the final version of the defendant's work to determine whether he engaged in unauthorized copying.
The court first should determine whether the defendant engaged in unauthorized copying while developing his work. Following indirectly the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Midway
Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc.,352 the court next

should evaluate the economic significance of any copying: if the defendant copied while developing his work, received a substantial economic benefit from doing so, and that economic benefit persists in the
final product, he should be held to have violated the plaintiff's copyright, regardless of whether the defendant's final product appears to be
a copy of the original. Thus, if the defendant copied while developing
his work, his subsequent alterations should exonerate him only if they
eliminate the economic advantage he gained by copying. This approach
will minimize the inequity of the subsequent alteration defense, yet

prevent a copyright holder from inhibiting competition because of a literal but trival copyright violation.

(3) Absent evidence of copying, the court should examine whether
the defendant's work constitutes a derivative work, again focusing on
the defendant's conduct. The court should determine whether the defendant developed his program by basing it on or deriving it from the
plaintiff's program. There are three pertinent questions: First, did the
defendant make substantial physical use of the plaintiff's work by, for
example, dissecting a copy of the plaintiff's source code that the defendant had received under a license agreement or decompiling an
ROM he had purchased? Second, did the defendant borrow from the
plaintiff's program material detailed enough that it could be characterized as expression? The Copyright Act will apply only if the material

appropriated was a detailed outline of the program, if not code itself,
and not merely general programming ideas. For reasons discussed in
the preceding recommendation, the plaintiff need only show that the
defendant appropriated such material at some point in the development process, regardless of the ultimate similarity of the two works.
Third, did the defendant derive a substantial economic advantage from
352. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
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using the plaintiff's work? This inquiry is designed to prevent copyright holders from inhibiting competition unreasonably. Again, the
subsequent alteration defense should apply only if the alterations eliminated the advantage the defendant gained from his otherwise unlawful
use of the plaintiff's program.
(4) Focusing on the defendant's conduct and any advantage he derived from it, the court should consider all relevant circumstantial evidence. The defendant's subsequent alterations may be evidence that he
earlier engaged in significant copying or derivation. Similarly, the defendant's appropriation of a user-level language may be relevant to his
credibility in determining whether similarities between his and the
plaintiff's programs resulted from derivation or were incidental to the
program's functional equivalency. Substantial similarity of the competing works is also circumstantial evidence. Although in many cases it
will remain the most important circumstantial evidence, it should not
be considered the sole relevant circumstantial evidence, nor should its
preeminence be presumed conclusively.
Although this model requires the court to make many subjective
judgments, so does the prevailing interpretation of the Copyright Act.
In software litigation, however, traditional copyright doctrine requires
judgments that are likely to be uninformed and thus conjectural. For
example, how can a district court decide whether the facial similarity of
two source codes is substantial? 353 The proposed model instead requires
judgments of human conduct and economic significance-matters with
which courts and jurors deal daily. The proposed model, although imperfect, will balance more equitably the competing interests of free
competition and reasonable proprietary expectations, and will do so in a
manner consistent with the letter and spirit of the Copyright Act.

353. It recently has been suggested that the manner in which an allegedly infringing
program organizes and processes data will provide important clues in determining
whether another program was used in its creation. See McClure & Sher, Evaluating
Claims of Software Copying Through Data Analysis (PartI/), 3 SOFTWARE PROTECTION 6
(Aug. 1984).
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Addendum: Note on Recently Decided Cases
Since this Article went to press, two United States District Courts
have issued opinions dealing with infringement of a copyright in computer software. The reasoning in both cases is consistent with some of
the views expressed in this Article.
In the first case, Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,354 plaintiff Whelan was the assignee of the copyright in a program written in a language called EDL and intended for use on IBM
minicomputers. 355 The program originally had been developed for defendant Jaslow, which therefore had access to the source code for the
EDL version.356 Without authorization from Whelan, a programmer
working under Jaslow's direction prepared a BASIC language version of
the program that would run on IBM Personal Computers (PCs). 357 The
second version was virtually identical to the original in mode of opera35 8
tion and functions performed.
After disposing of several preliminary issues, the court turned to
the "more difficult factual determination . . .as to whether the IBMPC program ... constitutes copyright infringement. 3 59 The court
stated that although the idea of a program for performing a particular
function is not protected, "[t]he expression of the idea embodied in a
computer program is protected by the copyright laws even though it
must be altered and refined to be made adaptable to different types of
computers that have different methods of responding to command controls and therefore require different source codes. '360 The court reasoned from this legal premise in finding that the PC version of the
program infringed even though it was not a literal copy or translation of
the original. 3 6 1 Relying on the testimony of plaintiff's expert, the court
emphasized that defendant's programmer had acquired thorough
knowledge from his access to the original program, 362 and that "probespective users and customers . . . found no substantial difference
'3 6 3
tween the [two programs], and considered them to be the same.
The procedural history of the second case, SAS Institute, Inc. v.
S&H Computer Systems, Inc.,3 6 4 is outlined above. 365 The court found
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

No. 83-4583 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1985).
Slip op. at 3-5, 7-8.
Id at 15.
Id at 15-16.
Id. at 33-35.
Id at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31-35.
Id. at 18-19, 34-35.
Id at 34.
Nos. 82-3669, 82-3670 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 1985).
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the facts to be substantially as alleged by SAS Institute.3 66 Programmers affiliated with S&H set out to create a version of the Institute's
SAS program for computers other than the large IBM computers for
which it originally had been written. 36 7 The new product was to be
fully compatible with SAS, 368 so that SAS users would notice no functional differences between the two programs. In writing the new program, which was in a different computer language than SAS, the S&H
programmers studied SAS source code, copied the SAS code literally in
a number of instances, and appropriated extensively the structure and
organizational details of SAS. 3 69 After the dispute began, S&H made a
concerted effort to edit the new program to minimize its similarity to
SAS. The court characterized this an "an effort to mask and disguise
3 70
evidence of copying.1
In finding infringement, the court dealt directly with a number of
the issues raised in this Article. First, the court eschewed the "ordinary
lay observer" approach to substantial similarity, instead accepting the
testimony of an expert witness on this point.3 71 Second, the court found
that both literal copying of source code and appropriation of organizational details constituted borrowing of expression.3 7 2 In reaching this
conclusion, the court observed that a computer program's function does
not dictate its form to the extent suggested by S&H: "Even in the case
of simple statistical calculations, there is room for variation . .. .,,73
Third, the court recognized that the quality, as well as quantity, of observed similarities may be relevant to their substantiality: "[T]he piracy
other name
of even a quantitatively small fragment ('a rose by any
3' 74
would smell as sweet') may be qualitatively substantial.
Fourth, the court found that besides being an infringing copy in the
sense of being substantially similar to SAS, the S&H product was an infringing derivative work.3 75 The court based its analysis on the premise
that "The [copyright] statute deals with human conduct, the nature of
the activity which resulted in the defendant's product.13 76 The court
evaluated S&H's conduct in light of the statutory definition of derivative work and found that "the product was substantially and pervasively
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See supra note 158.
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'based upon' SAS.
Last, the court rejected a subsequent alteration defense. The court
dismissed out of hand S&H's contention that it had not violated copyright law because the version of its product distributed had been edited
to the point that it was no longer substantially similar to SAS. As the
court put it, "S&H's argument that it can cure its infringement by simple excision is flatly inconsistent with the statute." 378 The court analogized the argument to the contention that a plagiarist "can
misappropriate every internal and external feature of a building, [and]
can then cure any impropriety by changing the tint of the windows and
'3 79
the color of the siding.
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